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If anyone renders himself liable to the lash and ºees to the church,
he shall be immune from scourging.1
[A husband can] use towards his wife such a degree of force as is
necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave her-
self; and unless some permanent injury be inºicted . . . the law
will not invade the domestic forum, or go behind the curtain.2
Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it
has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?3
I. Introduction
During the winter months of 2002, Americans were shocked and
dismayed to learn of boys having been sexually abused by Catholic priests.
Soon, the reports proliferated, inspiring more victims to come forward,
many of whom had suffered in silent anguish for years. That the priests
had acted criminally and taken advantage of the intimate trust of their young-
est and most vulnerable parishioners was bad enough. Worse still, it soon
became apparent that the Catholic Church itself, rather than acting decisive-
ly to end the victimizations and facilitate prosecutions, had engaged in a
systematic effort to shield predator priests dating back several decades.
The reasons and rationales underlying the Church’s behavior are com-
plex and not yet fully understood. Some apparent explanations include the
Church’s desire to recycle fallen priests due to personnel shortages and the
obvious public relations concerns presented by pedophile priests. However,
there is no mistaking another, more deeply institutional sensibility under-
girding the Church’s response: the idea that criminal abuse by clergy should
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 Charles H. Riggs, Jr., Criminal Asylum in Anglo-Saxon Law 6 (Univ. of Fla.
Monographs, Social Sciences No. 18, 1963) (translating laws attributed to Ine, King of the
West Saxons from 688 to 725).
2
 State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 262, 267 (1864).
3
 Mervyn A. King, Public Policy and the Corporation 1 (1977) (quoting Edward,
First Baron Thurlow, who lived from 1731 to 1806).
322 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 38
be sanctioned by the Church internally—if at all—in accordance with can-
oni-cal commands of contrition and forgiveness, and not by civil authorities.
The Church’s institutional response, while surely troubling, seemed
oddly out of place in a nation gripped by an ongoing “moral panic” over
sex offenders,4 marked by draconian prison terms, registration and com-
munity notiªcation laws,5 and even indeªnite, involuntary civil commit-
ment.6 Viewed in historical context, however, the Church’s behavior was
not so anomalous. For many centuries, churches have served as sanctu-
aries from criminal liability, offering refuge to clergy and laity alike, as
have other institutions over the years. As one late nineteenth-century scholar
observed, the “institution of sanctuaries has its root in a sentiment com-
mon to all humanity,”7 recognized through the centuries.
Indeed, two contemporary examples of sanctuary, also the focus of
recent media attention, involve institutions of equal centrality to Ameri-
can society: families and corporations.8 This Article explores the manner
in which Anglo-American law has, and has not, addressed criminal ac-
tivity within churches, families, and corporations. Each institution has
afforded a measure of immunity from prosecution, in effect establishing
criminal law sanctuaries that, under ideal circumstances, self-regulate
effectively without intrusion by government, but in less benign circum-
stances serve as criminogenic refuges.
As will be discussed, however, over time government has become
less tolerant of the sanctuaries, eroding the exceptionalism they embody
and implementing legal strategies intended to punish and deter the harms
they have insulated. Such efforts have been motivated by a variety of inºu-
ential catalysts, most notably feminism, victims’ rights, and populism.
This trend, in turn, has been augmented by the historical governmental
predisposition to increase its punitive reach, which in modern times has
been galvanized by aggressive and increasingly omnipresent media reportage.
The evolving willingness of government to invoke the criminal law
to address wrongs committed within church, family, and corporation, in
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 See generally Philip Jenkins, Moral Panic: Changing Concepts of the Child
Molester in Modern America (1998).
5
 See generally Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 Minn. L.
Rev. 147, 158–67 (2000) (describing registration and notiªcation initiatives).
6
 See generally Samuel J. Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of Psychopaths and Pen-
dulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L.
Rev. 69, 70–76 (2000) (chronicling the resurgence of sex offender commitment laws).
7
 Thomas John De’ Mazzinghi, Sanctuaries 1 (Stafford, England, Halden & Son
1887).
8
 The ªnancial abuses of Enron and WorldCom are only two of many recently reported
instances of corporate wrongdoing. See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Annus Horribilis: Corporate
Scandals, Lingering Recession Made 2002 Truly Horrible Year, S.F. Chron., Dec. 29,
2002, at G1, 2002 WL 403925812 (providing chronology of corporate scandal revelations
in 2002). For a recent discussion of the persistent failure of the criminal law to punish and
curtail intra-familial abuse, see Deborah Sontag, Fierce Entanglements, N.Y. Times, Nov.
17, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 52.
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the face of historic de facto and de jure shields from accountability, is a
story rich in interconnections and parallels. Each institution has enjoyed
preeminent social standing, allowing it to command governmental defer-
ence and discourage efforts to intervene. In turn, insularity endemic to
the institutions has made them reluctant to publicly acknowledge wrong-
doing occurring within their privileged realms. Taken together, these
shared institutional characteristics present strikingly similar challenges to
the application of the criminal law.
The Article begins with an overview of the historic criminal law
sanctuaries of churches, families and corporations, exploring the social,
political, and jurisprudential reasons for their existence, as well as the
government’s eventual efforts to address the criminal wrongs they have
shielded. The discussion then turns to governmental efforts to detect, punish,
and deter criminal harms in the context of families and corporations, in
particular. The Article concludes that the criminal law, despite its unique
expressive function in condemning misconduct, has failed to achieve
unequivocal success in its campaigns against criminal abuse in the domestic
and corporate contexts. Drawing lessons from social science research, it
offers some insights into how the law might best be employed to combat
criminal sexual abuse within the Church, a similarly closed institution with
analogous incentives and capacity for obscuring criminal activity.
II. Sanctuaries
A. The Church
1. Historic Role of Sanctuary
Historically, churches afforded sanctuary to those seeking refuge from
private vengeance for alleged wrongdoing. The Bible itself refers three
times to the right of sanctuary for accidental homicides,9 and endorses its
use to guard against the unconstrained reciprocal blood-lettings custom-
ary at the time.10 Once the individual reached a physical site of sanctuary,
such as an altar11 or a designated city,12 his contention that the death was
                                                                                                                             
9
 See Moshe Greenberg, The Biblical Conception of Asylum, 78 J. Biblical Litera-
ture 125, 125 (1959).
10
 See, e.g., Exodus 21:12–14 (New Oxford rev. standard version 1977):
Whoever strikes a man so that he dies shall be put to death. But if he did not lie in
wait for him, but God let him fall into his hand, then I will appoint for you a place
to which he may ºee. But if a man willfully attacks another to kill him treacher-
ously, you shall take him from my altar, that he may die.
Id.
11
 See Ignatius Bau, This Ground is Holy: Church Sanctuary and Central
American Refugees 127–29 (1985).
12
 See id. at 125; see also Numbers 35:6–34 (commanding Moses to establish six cities
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accidental was evaluated. If conªrmed, the individual could avoid retri-
bution so long as he remained at the site.13 If deemed guilty of intentional
homicide, he was delivered to his avenger.14
Sanctuary played a similarly central role in Grecian society. In Ath-
ens, “[a]lmost every temple afforded protection to criminals, even to
those who had committed the worst crimes, and no fugitive could be
molested or dragged forth.”15 Sanctuary seekers were seen as suppliants
and “held sacred as being under divine protection.”16 The Romans, in
contrast, were less predisposed to sanctuary, affording only temporary
refuge until formal adjudication by civil authorities could proceed, and
civil sanction could be applied.17
With the spread of Christianity during the third and fourth centuries
C.E., secular authority came to expressly recognize the ecclesiastic right
to sanctuary.18 The early Christian Church deªned the physical parame-
ters of sanctuary,19 and while government at times reserved the right to
exempt certain wrongdoers (such as public debtors, murderers, and apos-
tates),20 ecclesiastic authority almost exclusively determined the avail-
ability of sanctuary. However, because Church ofªcials often found it
difªcult to draw legal and moral distinctions among offenders, as a prac-
tical matter protection was afforded to almost all criminals.21 According
to one commentator:
                                                                                                                             
on Levitical land that were to serve as refuges).
13
 Individuals seeking sanctuary in a Levitical city, as opposed to a local altar, were
thought to be seeking the expungement of bloodguilt, which could occur only with the
death of the high priest, with its consequent expiatory value for the city-at-large. See
Greenberg, supra note 9, at 130. With the high priest’s passing, sanctuary beneªciaries
were allowed to return to the places from which they had taken refuge. Id.
14
 See Exodus 21:14; Numbers 35:31.
15
 Norman Maclaren Trenholme, The Right of Sanctuary in England: A




 Id. at 6.
18
 Id. at 7 (discussing Constantine’s Edict of Toleration (313 C.E.) and the Theodosian
Code (392 C.E.)).
19
 See 2 The Reports of Sir John Spelman 335 (Publ’ns of the Selden Society Vol.
94, J.H. Baker ed., 1978) [hereinafter Spelman Reports] (“It was held sufªcient to place
any part of the body within the sanctuary, or to grasp the door-ring; this seems to be the
signiªcance of the sanctuary-knockers to be found in some churches, though it was vital to
touch the ring only if there was no cemetery in front of the door.”). Although initially lim-
ited to the physical conªnes of the church building itself, in the ªfth century sanctuary was
extended to the walls of churchyards, including the residences of clergy, cloisters, courts,
and graveyards. This was justiªed by the need to feed and house sanctuary seekers, which
was not permissible in the church itself. See J. Charles Cox, The Sanctuaries and
Sanctuary Seekers of Medieval England 3, 5 (1911). In 511 C.E., the Synod of Or-
leans decreed that sanctuary was also to extend to the bishop’s residence and thirty-ªve
paces beyond it. Id. at 4.
20
 Cox, supra note 19, at 4; Trenholme, supra note 15, at 8–9.
21
 Cox, supra note 19, at 4.
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[While sanctuary] had been designed to extend protection to the
innocent maliciously pursued, to the injured, to the oppressed, and
the unfortunate, . . . [in time it] was so much extended that the
most atrocious and guilty of malefactors could be found enjoy-
ing immunity within sacred walls and bidding deªance to the civil
power.22
If sanctuary were successfully secured, the Church would not surrender
the beneªciary unless the party seeking custody would attest that the al-
leged wrongdoer would remain free from immediate harm.23 The Church,
in short, played a foremost role as intercessor:
Churches were under the guardianship of local saints, and in the
popular mind this cast an aura of supernatural protection about
them. Royal protection supplemented this supernatural protec-
tion, for all churches were under the king’s [authority] . . . .
[A]sylum breach was a sacrilege punished by excommunication,
and various penances, depending upon the case, had to be un-
dergone before absolution could be obtained.24
Under the reign of Ine, King of the West Saxons from 688 to 725 C.E.,
the law spared all persons subject to the death penalty, meaning all fel-
ons, if they ºed to a church and paid compensation known as “bot.”25 Under
the bot system, alleged malefactors would make monetary payments to
their victims or their agents,26 which served to avoid traditional resort to
bloodfeud and unconstrained vengeance.27 Sanctuary seekers subject to the
non-capital sanction of scourging were similarly spared blood vengeance.28
                                                                                                                             
22
 Trenholme, supra note 15, at 9.
23
 Cox, supra note 19, at 5. No such dispensation was available, however, if the sanc-
tuary seeker was suspected of night highway robbery or otherwise guilty of grave sins
within the church’s physical boundaries. Id.
24
 Riggs, supra note 1, at 26–27.
25
 Id.; see also id. at 10 (describing the system as permitting offenders to “pay dam-
ages to the injured party, and thus ‘buy off’ the threat of feud”).
26
 See id. at 6 (quoting a law from the reign of Ine stating that “[i]f anyone is liable to
the death penalty, and he ºees to a church, his life shall be spared and he shall pay such
compensation as he is directed [to pay] by legal decision”). Ine’s laws focused almost ex-
clusively on theft, robbery, and marauding, then the predominant concerns in the unstable
agrarian economy. Id. at 15. To avoid death, violators were required to pay the injured
party and the King’s Exchequer; if unable to pay, penal enslavement ensued. Id. at 20. For
discussion of the bot system more generally, see 2 Frederick Pollock & Frederic Wil-
liam Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, at 450–
51 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (2d ed. 1898); Stanley Rubin, The Bot, or Compensation
in Anglo-Saxon Law: A Reassessment, 17 J. Legal Hist. 144 (1996).
27
 Riggs, supra note 1, at 10; see also id. at 37 n.23 (“Medieval ecclesiastical asylum
rules were, above all, designed to prevent violence and bloodshed.”). Anyone who com-
mitted a murder within the conªnes of a church, however, was “botless,” and typically
subject to execution. Trenholme, supra note 15, at 15.
28
 Riggs, supra note 1, at 6.
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In tenth-century England, a more powerful form of sanctuary emerged:
the chartered sanctuary, formally devised by the Crown. Unlike ordinary
church sanctuary, which could be secured in every consecrated church and
its immediate environs, chartered sanctuaries provided more ample pro-
tections, including broader geographic scope, a greater gamut of protected
offenses, and a longer period of immunity during which to secure bot.29
Chartered sanctuaries were demarcated by an extended network of crosses
that “showed the fugitive that he had reached a place of safety and
warned his pursuers not to trespass further.”30 Those wishing to violate
the sacred bounds of sanctuary and seize a beneªciary risked seven gra-
dations of penalty, which increased with proximity to the church altar.31
The ultimate penalty was death.32
Beneªciaries of chartered sanctuaries, which often encompassed exten-
sive geographic areas,33 submitted to the governance of ecclesiastic authori-
                                                                                                                             
29
 The bot immunity period ranged from thirty days to the rest of the offender’s natural
life. Trenholme, supra note 15, at 14–15. Trenholme recounts the procedures used at
Beverley in the event bot could not be secured and in situations involving recidivists:
If the canons could not make peace between the sanctuary-seeker and his pursuers
inside of thirty days, then he was safely conducted, by land or by water, to the
borders of the county of York and then allowed to seek safety in fresh ºight. If
anyone came a second time for protection he was to be received and treated as be-
fore. But if for a third time he ºed for his life to the church, then he was to be-
come a perpetual servant of the church, because his life and limbs had for the
third and last time been preserved to him.
Id. at 50–51; see also Cox, supra note 19, at 134–35.
30
 Trenholme, supra note 15, at 47. The crosses were inscribed with the term “sanc-
tuarium,” and “probably marked the way to a sanctuary and served to guide fugitives fur-
ther.” Id. at 48. Trenholme describes the chartered sanctuary reception process as follows:
On arriving at a chartered sanctuary the seeker for protection had, in most cases,
to go through certain formalities of admission. Usually he had to make confession
of his crime to one of the sanctuary ofªcials, in some cases to the royal coroner,
to surrender all his arms, and place himself under the supervision of the religious
head of the place, bishop, abbot, or prior. He then swore to observe the rules and
regulations governing those dwelling in sanctuary, and a small ªne or admission
fee was paid to one or other of the sanctuary ofªcials of the church or convent.
His name, domicile, occupation, confession of crime, the instrument used, the
name of the victim, or victims, and other particulars, were registered in the church
or sanctuary register, kept for that purpose.
Id. at 48–49.
31
 Often the particular place of physical sanctuary was a “frith stol” or “chair of
peace,” described by one commentator as follows: “This chair, usually of carven stone,
stood beside the high altar and like fertre or shrine, containing the relics deposited behind
the altar, it insured complete and absolute protection to the sanctuary-seeker.” Id. at 47–48;
see also Cox, supra note 19, at 128–29.
32
 See Trenholme, supra note 15, at 48 (noting that “[a]nyone who violated the sacred
precincts of the altar committed an unpardonable offense, one for which no money pay-
ment could atone”); see also Cox, supra note 19, at 126–27; Riggs, supra note 1, at 26.
33
 See Cox, supra note 19, at 126–27 (noting that the chartered sanctuary at Beverley
“extended for about a mile and a half in every direction”).
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ties and carried on with their lives.34 At times, they even enjoyed immu-
nity from secular trial if they committed further crimes outside the physi-
cal conªnes of the chartered sanctuary.35 Safely ensconced in sanctuary,
the fugitives “formed a community absolutely apart from the rest of the
world, living a life of their own.”36
With the Norman Conquest, and for centuries thereafter, sanctuary
maintained a close relation to secular law. In 1067, William the Con-
queror, grateful for his victory over the Saxons and wishing to memori-
alize it, founded Battle Abbey, a sanctuary of unprecedented authority
and scope. According to one historian:
[The founding charter constituted] one of the most comprehen-
sive documents of the time. Amongst the numerous privileges
and immunities granted to the monks is that of affording full
and complete sanctuary to fugitives and criminals: “If any thief
or murderer or person guilty of other crime, ºeeing for fear of
death, should reach this church, then in nothing let him be pun-
ished, but, free in every way, let him be dismissed”—so ran the
words of the charter.37
In the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, the practice of abju-
ration of the realm complemented sanctuary. After having admitted
wrongdoing, the sanctuary seeker, within forty days of arrival at a non-
chartered sanctuary, would agree to be forever exiled from England or,
with rarity, elect to face secular trial.38 Abjurers were required to depart
as soon as possible, and the port of embarkation, route, and time taken to
reach the destination were speciªed in advance.39 They forfeited their
goods and chattel to the King, and their lands, if any, escheated to the
lord from whom they were held. Further, to communicate their status to
the world-at-large, abjurers’ thumbs were branded with an “A.”40 In the
event sanctuary seekers either refused to leave or chose to be tried by civil
authorities, the Church typically refused to surrender them, requiring the
King to remove the subject by force, to cut off his food supplies, or to set
                                                                                                                             
34
 See id. at 144; Trenholme, supra note 15, at 50; Isobel D. Thornley, The Destruc-
tion of Sanctuary, in Tudor Studies 182, 193 (R. W. Seton-Watson ed., 1924).
35
 See 2 Spelman Reports, supra note 19, at 341.
36
 Trenholme, supra note 15, at 70. Once there, although strictly prohibited by sanc-
tuary rules, sanctuary beneªciaries would at times band together and revisit the outside
world, plundering and scaring residents. See id. at 71; see also Thornley, supra note 34, at
185–86.
37
 Trenholme, supra note 15, at 19.
38
 Cox, supra note 19, at 10–21; Trenholme, supra note 15, at 22–23.
39
 Trenholme, supra note 15, at 37–38. The abjurer was required to carry a wooden
cross and to wear a long white robe, which would distinguish him from other medieval
travelers on the King’s Highway. Id. at 40. Abjurers were protected so long as they re-
mained on the Highway; those who strayed were subject to death. Id. at 41.
40
 Id. at 24.
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ªre to the church.41 Such confrontations, in turn, raised understandable
concern among ecclesiastic authorities, who believed church grounds
were sacrosanct and that the right to remove sanctuary seekers belonged
exclusively to the church.42
Sanctuary commanded secular deference well into Tudor times, shield-
ing laity and clergy alike, with the latter often being accorded special
dispensation.43 Eventually, however, the Crown undertook to curtail its
availability. In 1467, sanctuary was denied to recidivist offenders, and
only afforded to beneªciaries against the loss of life and limb, not prop-
erty.44 Under the reign of Henry VIII, persons suspected of high treason
were denied sanctuary,45 and for the ªrst time, those granted sanctuary
were required to wear a distinctive mark on their upper garments and were
forbidden to carry arms or go outside at night.46 In 1530, the King abol-
ished the practice of abjuring the realm, requiring that individuals take an
oath to remain in domestic sanctuary,47 and specifying that abjurers
committing subsequent offenses were to relinquish sanctuary and be
subject to imprisonment.48 In 1540, chartered sanctuaries were abolished;
general sanctuary was limited to parish and cathedral churches and yards,
and church-run hospitals and colleges;49 and sanctuary privileges were
abolished for persons suspected of committing murder, rape, highway
robbery, burglary, arson or sacrilege.50 In lieu of chartered sanctuaries, the
Crown imbued seven or eight51 speciªed towns with sanctuary status.52 These
                                                                                                                             
41
 Id. at 39.
42
 Cox, supra note 19, at 20–21; De’ Mazzinghi, supra note 7, at 97.
43
 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 19, at 21 (describing such an instance in 1299); Tren-
holme, supra note 15, at 43 (noting that, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the
law prohibited clergy from abjuring, instead forcing them to surrender to ecclesiastical
courts for “spiritual offenses” and to secular authorities for common law crimes, where
they in turn would be permitted to invoke “beneªt of clergy” and escape the most severe
punishments). For a discussion of beneªt of clergy, see infra notes 60–67 and accompany-
ing text.
44
 Trenholme, supra note 15, at 28.
45




 Cox, supra note 19, at 321. Statutory law at the time suggested that the King’s deci-
sion to outlaw abjuration was prompted by concern that the abjurers in their subsequent travels
would lend aid to other nations in time of war and otherwise “disclose[ ] their knowledge





 Id. at 324; De’ Mazzinghi, supra note 7, at 16; Trenholme, supra note 15, at 30–
31. Queen Mary, in 1556, restored Westminster’s charter, which was subsequently repealed
by Queen Elizabeth I. Cox, supra note 19, at 75; Thornley, supra note 34, at 204 n.116.
Thornley notes that “sanctuary . . . was a very tough privilege, which survived more than
one legal abolition.” Thornley, supra note 34, at 204 n.16.
50
 Cox, supra note 19, at 16.
51
 Trenholme reports seven towns. Trenholme, supra note 15, at 44, 71. Cox and
Thornley report eight. Cox, supra note 19, at 326; Thornley, supra note 34, at 204.
52
 The towns themselves were expected to receive a maximum of twenty sanctuary
seekers, who enjoyed lifelong protection, and were to be directed to another sanctuary
town in the event one was ªlled to capacity. Cox, supra note 19, at 326. The beneªciaries
2003] Criminal Law Sanctuaries 329
sanctuary towns were themselves abolished in 1603, under the reign of King
James I.53
Although for several centuries sanctuary had shielded an estimated
one thousand individuals a year in England,54 it ended there in the mid- to
late seventeenth century.55 Its widespread use by fraudulent debtors and
political enemies of the King more generally ªgured prominently in its
demise.56 The principal cause, however, lay in the State’s growing desire
to exercise punitive control over criminal misbehavior, which clashed with
the merciful exceptionalism of the Church.57 As a product of a time when
justice was rough and crude, sanctuary served the vital purpose of staving
off immediate blood revenge.58 With the growing capacity of the State to
impose its will independent of ecclesiastic authority, and increasing faith
in the fairness and effectiveness of secular law, sanctuary was curtailed.
And with its decline, not surprisingly, came a concomitant dramatic rise
in execution rates.59
Despite its formal demise, the spirit of sanctuary lived on for many
years in the practice known as “beneªt of clergy,” which did not offer
outright immunity, but served, when available, to mitigate the severity of
secular law.60 Beneªt of clergy originated as a concession by the Crown
to the Church in the wake of the December 1170 murder of Archbishop
                                                                                                                             
“were to be mustered daily, and on not appearing for three days to lose their privilege.” Id.
The towns themselves, not unexpectedly, resisted designation and, in some instances, suc-
ceeded in their efforts to be removed from the list of eligible enclaves. Id. at 326–28.
53
 Cox, supra note 19, at 329. The law adopted by Parliament in the time of King
James I stated: “‘And Be it alsoe [sic] enacted by the authoritie [sic] of this present Parlia-
ment, that no Sanctuarie [sic] or Privilege of Sanctuary shalbe [sic] hereafter admitted or
allowed in any case.’” Bau, supra note 11, at 157 (quoting a law from King James I reign).
54
 Cox, supra note 19, at 33; see also Bau, supra note 11, at 157.
55
 Trenholme cites the date of demise as 1697. Trenholme, supra note 15, at 31. Cox,
on the other hand, asserts that sanctuary was “swept away” in 1624. Cox, supra note 19, at 329.
56
 Trenholme, supra note 15, at 25.
57
 As William Holdsworth noted, “[a]s the state grew into conscious life it was inevita-
ble that occasions for disputes between the temporal and spiritual powers should arise.” 1
William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 584 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Han-
bury eds., 7th ed. 1956); see also Cox, supra note 19, at 17 (noting that sanctuary involved
“a perpetual conºict between the State and the Church. The Church was merciful . . . ; but
the State . . . must also be held to be within its rights in endeavouring to prevent criminals
from gaining access to sanctuaries . . . .”); E. W. Ives, Crime, Sanctuary, and Royal Authority
Under Henry VIII: The Exemplary Sufferings of the Savage Family, in On the Laws and
Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E. Thorne 296, 298–99 (Morris S.
Arnold et al. eds., 1981) (quoting Chief Justice of the Kings Bench, Sir John Finenx, in
1520, who noted that permanent sanctuary “is a thing so derogatory to justice and contrary
to the common good of the Realm that it is not sufferable by the law”).
58
 “Immunities,” as one historian has noted, “suppose the law deªcient, and the right to
sanctuary was such as [sic] immunity.” De’ Mazzinghi, supra note 7, at 100.
59
 See id. at 103 (noting that the rate of execution was ninety-eight times greater “after
the right to sanctuary had been greatly disturbed by legislative measures”).
60
 See generally George W. Dalzell, Beneªt of Clergy in America and Related
Matters (1955); Leona C. Gabel, Beneªt of Clergy in England in the Later
Middle Ages (1928); Edward J. White, Legal Antiquities: A Collection of Essays
Upon Ancient Laws and Customs 223–43 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1986) (1913).
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Thomas Becket in Canterbury Cathedral,61 by knights dispatched by Henry
II in response to the Church’s resistance to civil rule.62 As initially ap-
plied, the beneªt extended only to the clergy, permitting them to be ad-
judged by more lenient ecclesiastic courts.63 By the fourteenth century,
however, the beneªt extended to any male who could read,64 and with
increased literacy a greater proportion of society became eligible.65 Over
the ensuing centuries, governments, both in England and America, anx-
ious over their diminished criminal jurisdiction, gradually reduced the
breadth of crimes eligible for the beneªt of clergy by means of legisla-
tion.66 And with its demise, as with that of sanctuary, government quickly
reverted to widespread use of the death penalty.67
2. The Catholic Church Child Sex Abuse Scandal
Despite the passage of centuries, and the continued evolution of State
power, the modern Catholic Church’s response to allegations of sexual
abuse by its clergy reveals perceptible traces of medieval sanctuary. Then, as
now, churches served as “the great intermediaries between criminals and
those who desired vengeance, and acted as ambassadors of mercy before
the throne of justice.”68 Although the Church’s role in shielding its own
                                                                                                                             
61
 See 2 Spelman Reports, supra note 19, at 327. The notorious murder was chroni-
cled by T. S. Eliot in his classic 1935 play Murder in the Cathedral.
62
 A principal catalyst of the secular-ecclesiastic power struggle occurred in the elev-
enth century, when Pope Gregory VII rejected the authority of secular authorities to ap-
point and govern bishops, which led to the Wars of Investiture. See Harold Joseph Ber-
man, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 94–99
(1983). The Concordat of Worms eased tensions some ªfty years later, ensuring the Church
considerable autonomy while affording secular authorities some say in the selection of
bishops. Id. at 98. The competition continued to simmer for decades thereafter, however,
culminating in Becket’s murder. Id. at 255. For more on the church-state struggle waged in
medieval and early modern Europe, see generally Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s
Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (1957); Thomas J. Renna,
Church and State in Medieval Europe, 1050–1314 (1974).
63
 In such courts, life in prison was the maximum sentence. Other sentences included
defrocking (for clergy), brief imprisonment in a monastery, forfeiture of goods (but not of
land), branding, ªne, or exile for up to fourteen years. See Phillip M. Spector, The Sen-
tencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. Tol. L. Rev. 511, 516 (2002).
64
 Gabel, supra note 60, at 68–78. According to Professor Langbein, women were not
permitted to invoke the beneªt of clergy until 1624. John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eight-
eenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 37
(1983). More generally, individuals were eligible for the beneªt only once and authorities
branded the thumbs of those already having beneªted to serve as evidence of their future
ineligibility. Id. at 37–38.
65
 Dalzell, supra note 60, at 11 (asserting that even when limited to clergy, the beneªt
“served at once as factories of crime and as instruments of mercy”). Dalzell adds: “The
remarkable point is that the clergy should have been able to maintain for centuries a special
privilege in crime. This is a corollary to the magnitude and power of the church, which, it
must be remembered, was the sole civilizing agent throughout the period.” Id. at 13.
66
 See Jerome Hall, Theft, Law, and Society 68–87 (1935).
67
 Spector, supra note 63, at 517.
68
 Cox, supra note 19, at 3. For its part, canon law continued to make reference to the
2003] Criminal Law Sanctuaries 331
has only recently come to light, it is apparent that the Church proved re-
markably effective in affording sanctuary to abusive priests since the early
1960s, and doubtless before that.69 According to a recent survey con-
ducted by the New York Times, over 1200 Catholic priests have allegedly
molested minors over the past ªfty years, implicating all but 16 of the
nation’s 177 dioceses.70 The survey reports that just under two percent of
all priests ordained between 1950 and 2001 were thought to have com-
mitted sexual abuse, a ªgure that is thought to signiªcantly underestimate
the prevalence of abusive priests.71 The survey also documents that 4200
children reported abuse by priests and that almost half of the priests were
accused of abusing more than one minor, one-third three or more, and
sixteen percent ªve or more.72 Moreover, contrary to the common belief
that the overwhelming majority of victimizations involved teenagers,73
forty-three percent of priests were accused of molesting children twelve
years old and younger.74 The survey emphasizes that in the coming years
the rates will very likely increase as more victims feel emotionally and
                                                                                                                             
right until the latter part of the twentieth century. See James Hennesey, Right of Sanctu-
ary—Then and Now, 125 America 482, 482 (1971) (quoting the encyclical abandoned in
the 1983 Code of Canon Law stating that “a church enjoys the right of asylum so that weak
criminals who ºee to it are not to be removed from it, except in case of necessity, without
the assent of the ordinary or the rector of the church”).
Of course, the “Sanctuary Movement” of the 1980s, which shielded politically perse-
cuted Central American refugees who had entered the United States illegally, is further
testament to the contemporary vitality of the phenomenon in religious circles. See gener-
ally Ann Crittenden, Sanctuary: A Story of American Conscience and the Law
in Collision (1988); Robert Tomsho, The American Sanctuary Movement (1987).
For discussion of non-Western instances of religious sanctuary, including that of the Abo-
rigines of Australia and New Guinea, Hindus on the Malibar Coast, and the Kaªes of Hin-
dukush, see Carlos Urrutia Aparicio, Diplomatic Asylum in Latin America 14 (1960).
69
 See Boston Globe, Betrayal: The Crisis in the Catholic Church 112 (2002)
(noting that the Philadelphia Archdiocese acknowledged having “credible evidence” that
thirty-ªve priests sexually abused about ªfty children dating back to 1950); see also Juliet
Williams, Milwaukee Archdiocese: Parishioners Get Chance to Question Ofªcials, St.
Paul Pioneer Press, June 27, 2002, at 4B, 2002 WL 7854236 (noting that the Milwaukee
archdiocese would publish the names of all priests alleged to have engaged in sexual abuse
since 1926); cf. A.W. Richard Sipe, Sex, Priests and Power: Anatomy of a Crisis 10
(1995) (recounting the experience of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who experienced, at age
ªfteen, sexual abuse by an older boy at a retreat center preparing for conªrmation and was
told by Church superiors that he should not pursue the matter).
70
 Laurie Goodstein, Decades of Damage: Trail of Pain in Church Crisis Leads to
Nearly Every Diocese, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2003, § 1, at 1.
71
 This is because those dioceses that have divulged allegedly complete lists, either
voluntarily or by court order, report signiªcantly higher rates. See id. (noting that in two
such dioceses, Baltimore and Manchester, New Hampshire, the rates were 6.2% and 7.7%,
respectively); see also Sam Dillon, Accounting of Abuse is Criticized, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8,
2002, at A41 (discussing the frustration experienced by the Chair of the National Review
Board, recently established by the Church to monitor its response to the abuse crisis, in its
efforts to obtain internal records on abuse).
72
 Goodstein, supra note 70.
73
 See, e.g., Philip Jenkins, Pedophiles and Priests: Anatomy of a Contempo-
rary Crisis 7 (1996) (“[T]he vast majority of recorded instances of clergy ‘abuse’ or mis-
conduct involve an interest in teenagers . . . often boys of ªfteen or sixteen.”).
74
 Goodstein, supra note 70.
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psychologically comfortable publicly reporting their abuse.75 Finally, ac-
cording to another recent survey, by the Dallas Morning News, roughly
two-thirds of Church ofªcials in the largest U.S. Catholic dioceses shel-
tered priests accused of sexual abuse, affording yet more evidence of the
institutional scope of the practice.76
As troubling as the numbers are, they fail to highlight the dogged ef-
forts of the Church to shield its clergy from civil authority. Only now, as
a result of the aggressive efforts of investigative journalists and plaintiffs’
counsel, are these efforts coming to light. Two notorious instances of Church
protection of alleged abusers are illustrative. Despite repeated warnings to
Church ofªcials, Father John Geoghan sexually preyed on children from
1962 to 1995, only to be referred to treatment at Church-afªli-ated centers
and moved from one parish to another until he was ªnally defrocked in
1998. For almost thirty-ªve years, Father Paul Shanley was shielded from
civil authorities and repeatedly relocated to new parishes, where he con-
tinued his serial offending with impunity.77 With respect to each of these
suspected abusers, as with hundreds of others, the Church dealt with the
criminal behavior internally and refused to notify civil authorities.78
The Church’s protective efforts have come at a large, and increasing,
ªnancial cost. Because the Church demanded and entered into conªdential-
ity agreements before ofªcial court ªlings,79 the precise amount the Church
                                                                                                                             
75
 Id. For another, less comprehensive media survey reporting similar results, see Alan
Cooperman & Lena H. Sun, Hundreds of Priests Removed Since ’60s: Survey Shows Scope
Wider than Disclosed, Wash. Post, June 9, 2002, at A1.
76
 See Dallas Morning News, Catholic Bishops and Sex Abuse, at http://www.dallasnews.
com/cgi-bin/2002/priests.cgi (last visted Mar. 21, 2003) (providing results from a three-
month investigation into records of the top leaders of the country’s 178 Roman Catholic
dioceses). For discussion of the international scope of the institutional predisposition, see
Warren Hoge, Irish Church to Cooperate with Abuse Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2002, at
A10. It bears mention, moreover, that the Church shielded laypersons afªliated with the
Church from prosecution through the years. See Laurie Goodstein, Dioceses Resist Releasing
Names of Accused Priests, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 2003, at A16 (noting that a grand jury in
Cleveland has uncovered accusations against 351 laypersons dating back decades).
77
 For in-depth descriptions of the extended predations of these and other priests, see
Jason Berry, Lead Us Not into Temptation: Catholic Priests and the Sexual
Abuse of Children (1992); Frank Bruni & Elinor Burkett, A Gospel of Shame:
Children, Sexual Abuse, and the Catholic Church (1993); Boston Globe, supra
note 69; Leslie Bennetts, Unholy Alliances, Vanity Fair, Dec. 1991, at 224. There are
more than 300 known victims of Geoghan and another priest, Father James Porter (who left
the priesthood in 1973). Boston Globe, supra note 69, at 91. To date, twenty-four indi-
viduals have admitted being victimized by Shanley. Pam Belluck, Cardinal Read Accusa-
tory Letter in ’85, 3 Say, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2002, at A26.
78
 See also Pam Belluck, Boston Church Papers Released: A Pattern of Negligence is
Cited, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 2002, at A1 (discussing the contents of two thousand pages of
documents produced during civil discovery highlighting the direct role of Boston Archdio-
cese ofªcials in protecting abusive priests); Robert D. McFadden, L.I. Diocese Deceived
Victims of Sexual Abuse, Grand Jury Says, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2003, at A1 (noting a
grand jury report based in part on “secret archives” chronicling behavior of the Rockville
Center, New York diocese that protected ªfty-eight abusive priests dating back to the 1970s
by means of an “intervention team” dedicated to discouraging public disclosures).
79
 Boston Globe, supra note 69, at 47; see also Michael Powell & Lois Romano, Ro-
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has paid in civil settlements cannot be known at this time. However, the
Church has acknowledged spending several hundred million dollars in
settlements over the past twenty years,80 in effect resurrecting the “bot”
system of centuries past.81 In practical effect, as reporters with the Boston
Globe have written, “the process led to an unholy alliance among Church
ofªcials, victims, and attorneys,”82 with each beneªting in some way
from the sanctuary afforded pedophilic priests.
Even without such secret settlements, abusers often avoided criminal
liability because victims and their families were reluctant to suffer public
exposure83 and cast the powerful Church in disrepute.84 Other victims failed
to come forward because they feared divine retribution,85 much as in the
Middle Ages,86 or succumbed to pressures from Church representatives
                                                                                                                             
man Catholic Church Shifts Legal Strategy: Aggressive Litigation Replaces Quiet Settle-
ments, Wash. Post, May 13, 2002, at A1 (noting that in past decades, customarily, a
“bishop met an aggrieved family; there were words of comfort, and perhaps the assurance
that the priest would get help. A small monetary settlement might be tendered, rarely more
than few thousand dollars. Eventually, the Church began offering victims counseling.”);
Daniel J. Wakin, Albany Diocese Quietly Paid Man Who Pressed Abuse Claim, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 19, 2003, at A25 (noting that the Albany, New York bishop, a prominent ªgure in the
Church’s public response to the abuse crisis, paid more than $375,000 in nonformal legal
settlements since 1994 to an abuse victim).
80
 See Peter Smith, Financial Stakes High in Suits Against the Church, Courier-J.
(Louisville), June 4, 2002, at A1, 2002 WL 20243282.
81
 The Church’s demand that victims keep silent (for the good of the Church) was en-
forced by its insistence that it could recover settlement monies if details of the abuse were
ever divulged. See Boston Globe, supra note 69, at 47; Powell & Romano, supra note 79.
82
 Boston Globe, supra note 69, at 47; see also id. at x–xi (describing the “agreeable
arrangement: the Church got to keep the ugly truth under wraps; shame-ªlled victims,
having no clue that there were many others, were able to protect their privacy. Victims’
lawyers received a third or more of the ªnancial settlements without ever having to test
their cases in court.”).
83
 See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Nearly 100 Kentucky Men Add to Accusations Against
Priests, N.Y. Times, May 28, 2002, at A15 (noting the role of shame and embarrassment in
deterring abuse victims from coming forward).
84
 See, e.g., Fox Butterªeld & Jenny Hontz, A Priest’s 2 Faces: Protector, Predator,
N.Y. Times, May 19, 2002, at A1 (noting the reluctance of the father of one of Shanley’s
victims “to go public with a prosecution against a priest . . . . That’s how it was in those
days.”). For a discussion of the deep-seated deference to the Church more generally, see
Boston Globe, supra note 69, at 119–40; cf. T. Christian Miller, In Latin America, Abuse
by Priests Hidden in Shadows, L.A. Times, July 31, 2002, at 1, 2002 WL 2493597 (dis-
cussing the strong inºuence of the Church in deterring accusations of clergy sexual abuse
in Latin American nations); Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, Reluctant Mexican Church
Begins to Question Its Own, Wash. Post, Apr. 17, 2002, at A12 (quoting a Mexican bishop
as stating that abusive priests should not be handed over to police because “[d]irty laundry
is best washed at home”).
85
 See Personnel Files Detail Priests’ Abuse in Boston, Wash. Post, June 5, 2002, at
A13 (noting that Father Paul Desilets, under indictment for 27 counts of sexual assault,
threatened one altar boy that he would “burn in hell” if he revealed the abuse he suffered).
Perhaps less divine, but surely inºuential, excommunication had historically loomed as a
sanction for any Catholic who sought redress against the Church or a priest in civil court.
See Jenkins, supra note 73, at 128.
86
 According to Trenholme, in the Middle Ages, sanctuary was fortiªed by “fear of Di-
vine vengeance,” whereby:
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not to pursue the matter publicly.87 Inaction of civil authorities further en-
sured priests’ immunity; when told of priestly sexual abuse, they did not
pursue prosecutions.88 A similar aversion predominated among the courts89
and the press.90
Only recently, after insisting for years that it alone enjoyed the pre-
rogative to decide whether allegations of abuse warranted prosecutorial
attention,91 has the Church hierarchy bowed to public pressure and grudg-
ingly disclosed the names of priests accused of sexual abuse over the
                                                                                                                             
the curse of a priest was more dreadful than a foeman’s steel . . . . Thus when the
Church said that those who sought her protection must be treated with leniency
and mercy, and their lives and persons spared, no state or individual was strong
enough or bold enough to refuse to comply.
Trenholme, supra note 15, at 95.
87
 See, e.g., Berry, supra note 77, at 282–83 (describing harassing phone calls by
priests to a couple that sought to have an abusive fellow priest removed); McFadden, supra
note 78 (discussing the practice of a diocese “intervention team,” comprised by two high-
ranking priests who were also lawyers, which treated abuse as “sin” and discouraged vic-
tims from contacting the police).
88
 See, e.g., Berry, supra note 77, at 294–97 (discussing the refusal of the New Orleans
District Attorney to prosecute an alleged pedophile priest, Dino Chinel, based on his ac-
knowledged unwillingness to “embarrass Holy Mother the Church”); id. at 336–37, 352,
360 (discussing the dismissive attitude of a Chicago State’s Attorney toward prosecuting
alleged pedophile priest Robert Lutz); Craig Whitlock & Annie Gowen, Strong Suspicions,
Years of Silence, Wash. Post, May 25, 2002, at A1 (noting the reluctance of a Baltimore
prosecutors to ªle charges despite an admission by a priest and repeated complaints about
him over the course of several years); cf. Fox Butterªeld, Report Details Sex Abuse by
Priests and Inaction by a Diocese, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2003 (noting suppression by a local
New Hampshire police chief of priest abuse allegations); Barbara Whitaker, Jesuits to Pay
$7.5 Million to Men Who Contended Abuse, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2002, at A18 (discussing
the behavior of a California sheriff who permitted a local Jesuit order to relocate a priest,
in lieu of his arrest).
89
 Boston Globe, supra note 69, at 125 (noting that Boston-area judges, “many of
them Catholic, were complicit in the secrecy that kept the extent of the abuse hidden from
public view”). In the early 1990s, for instance, a group of judges impounded all records in
three pending lawsuits, reasoning in the words of one judge “that the particulars of the
controversy” warranted privacy. Id.; see also Judge Faults a Court in Clergy Abuse Case,
N.Y. Times, June 14, 2002, at A33 (describing a recent decision by a Connecticut judge
condemning the judicial system for acceding to Church requests to seal incriminating rec-
ords over the objections of victims).
90
 Jenkins, supra note 73, at 61–62.
91
 Boston Globe, supra note 69, at 111. This sentiment has been buttressed by the
Church’s willingness to mount First Amendment non-entanglement arguments, predicated
on sentiments expressed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (“[C]ivil courts shall not disturb the decisions of
the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church . . . but must accept such decisions as
binding on them.”); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 448 (1969) (stating that religious institutions are afforded the
“power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church govern-
ment as well as those of faith and doctrine”). The Boston Archdiocese’s recent effort to
dismiss civil lawsuits on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the government lacks
authority to second-guess its decisions on where to assign priests and how to discipline them,
derives from this same willingness. See Adam Liptak, Boston Archdiocese Asks for Dis-
missal of All Suits, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2002, at A16.
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decades.92 Equipped with this information, prosecutors are at last prose-
cuting abusive priests, to the extent cases are not time-barred,93 and con-
sideration is being given to prosecuting Church ofªcials who allowed the
abuse to continue, on theories of child endangerment, obstruction of jus-
tice, accessory to a crime, and conspiracy.94 State legislatures, long de-
terred by First Amendment concerns and lobbying efforts by religious
groups, are now considering expanding statutes of limitations for child
sexual abuse prosecutions, and, for the ªrst time, opting to include clergy
within the ambit of mandatory reporting laws (heretofore targeting only
teachers, physicians, social workers, and the like).95
It is difªcult to understand, much less justify, how the Church—an
institution premised on a sacred trust with parishioners and theoretically
dedicated to their well-being—could have shielded pedophilic priests and
facilitated their continued wrongdoing. Perhaps the most benign expla-
nation is that the Church felt morally qualiªed to police its own, with
internal reprobation serving as adequate penalty.96 Less benignly, the Church
can be said to share the motivational impetus common to any powerful
institution faced with harmful information, engaging in damage control,97
and shielding potentially damaging internal documents.98
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 See, e.g., Boston Globe, supra note 69, at 110–17, 133; Sam Dillon, Role of Bish-
ops is Now a Focus of Grand Juries, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2002, at A1.
93
 See Pam Belluck, Priest Indicted in Sex Abuse of Teenage Boy During the 80’s, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 9, 2002, at A10 (reporting an indictment of Boston-area priest based on in-
formation recently disclosed by diocese); Daniel J. Wakin, Priest Charged From Old File
on Sex Abuse, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2002, at B1 (noting that, with Church ªles containing
forty-three abuse allegations involving twenty-ªve priests, prosecution was most often
time-barred). But see Sam Dillon, Means Found to Prosecute Decades-Old Abuse Cases,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 2002, at A16 (noting that prosecutors in several jurisdictions have
circumvented statutes of limitation by arguing that the provisions toll when priests move
out of the state).
94
 See Dillon, supra note 93; Edward Walsh, Prosecutors Examine Legal Culpability of
Church Ofªcials, Wash. Post, May 5, 2002, at A16. One grand jury report in New York,
for instance, accused the Church of “an orchestrated effort to protect abusing clergy mem-
bers from investigation, arrest and prosecution,” and called for new laws making it a felony
for church ofªcials to fail to report abuse allegations. Devlin Barrett, Grand Jury Scolds
Church Over Sex Abuse, Times Union (Albany), June 19, 2002, at B3, 2002 WL 8910953.
95
 See Seth Stern, More States Moving to Tighten Sex-Abuse Laws for Clergy, Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, June 10, 2002, at 4, 2002 WL 642671.
96
 See Thomas Keneally, Cold Sanctuary: How the Church Lost Its Mission, New Yorker,
June 24, 2002, at 58, 64 (noting the observation of New York Cardinal John O’Connor that,
historically, a priest caught engaging in sexual abuse “had ‘learned his lesson’ by being
caught, reported and embarrassed”).
97
 This institutional response included retribution against priests who spoke out against
their peers. See Keneally, supra note 96, at 64 (noting that a Massachusetts priest, after
warning his bishop of the presence of an offending priest and receiving no response, in-
formed the police, and was thereafter removed from his parish).
98
 See, e.g., Calvin Sims, Los Angeles Archdiocese Tries to Shield Documents, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 2, 2003, at A10 (discussing efforts by the Archdiocese of Los Angeles). Consistent
with this predisposition, in April 1990, one bishop at a regional Canon Law conference
publicly advised attendees to consider sending “dangerous” documents to the Vatican Am-
bassador, thereby allowing diplomatic immunity to be invoked. Berry, supra note 77, at 290.
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Whatever the Church’s motives, there is no mistaking the vestiges of
sanctuary in the Church’s response to allegations of abuse by its priests,
euphemistically referred to as being “in between assignments.”99 Even after
an internal oversight board in 1985 formally warned of widespread clergy
sexual abuse and mounting settlement costs, the Church failed to institute
structural changes and notify civil authorities of instances of abuse.100
Rather, the Church at most banished abusers to “treatment” centers through-
out the country101 and then dispersed them to new parishes upon their
purported recovery.102
The ªrst manifestation of institutional change came in June 2002
when the powerful U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops bowed to intense
pressure and engaged in an unprecedented public evaluation of how it
should respond to clergy sexual abuse. After heated debate, the Confer-
ence proposed adoption of several measures: implementation of a “zero tol-
erance” approach, requiring the removal of any priest for whom there is a
“credible accusation” of child sexual abuse; rescission of the Canon stat-
ute of limitations for sexual abuse claims; mandatory reporting of all abuse
accusations to civil authorities; and the creation of a national oversight
board, complemented by local review boards at the diocese level, to
monitor compliance with Dallas policies.103 The Conference refused to
address whether, and how, Church ofªcials themselves should be sanc-
tioned for their involvement in sheltering abusers.104 Priests belonging to
religious orders, such as the Jesuits, Dominicans, and Benedictines, were
also excepted from the Dallas recommendations. As a result, order priests,
who comprise one-third of the nation’s priests, would not be subject to
removal but rather would be maintained by their respective Orders.105
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 Boston Globe, supra note 69, at 32.
100
 See id. at 39 (discussing the rejection of a 1985 report entitled “The Problem of
Sexual Molestation by Roman Catholic Clergy—Meeting the Problem in a Comprehensive
and Responsible Manner,” and the subsequent discipline of its primary author); Brunt &
Burkett, supra note 53, at 162–65 (describing the report and the response by the Church);
Bruce Schultz, Sex Abuse By Clergy Not “Recent” Problem, Baton Rouge Advoc., May
2, 2002, at 9B, 2002 WL 5032969 (same).
101
 See Boston Globe, supra note 69, at 172–76 (discussing centers in Maryland,
Missouri, New Mexico, and Connecticut).
102
 See id. at 46–47 (discussing the rejection by the Boston archdiocese in 1993 of de-
mands that abusive priests be removed and the Church’s insistence that responsibility for
investigating complaints of clergy sexual misconduct was its own).
103
 See Laurie Goodstein, A Time to Bend: U.S. Bishops, Sure of Their Ground in the
Past, Let Public Opinion Guide Them This Time, N.Y. Times, June 16, 2002, at A1 (describing
the policy and its controversial adoption); Laurie Goodstein & Sam Dillon, Bishops Pro-
ceed Cautiously in Carrying Out Abuse Policy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 2002, at A1 (same).
104
 Day of Atonement, Newsweek, June 24, 2002, at 8.
105
 See Sam Dillon, Catholic Religious Orders Let Abusive Priests Stay, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 10, 2002, at A8 (noting the same and quoting an Order ofªcial as characterizing “zero
tolerance” as a “war slogan” inappropriate for the Orders, where an abuser is “still a mem-
ber of the family”). According to one victims’ group, roughly twenty-ªve percent of the docu-
mented cases of clergy sex abuse involved Order priests. Id. For a discussion of the ex-
tended history of abuse and cover-up in the world’s largest Benedictine institution, see Paul
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In mid-October 2002, the Vatican provided its ofªcial response, ex-
pressing deep concern over the Dallas prescriptions. The Vatican strongly
disagreed with particular measures it deemed contrary to Canon law and
tradition, especially the “zero tolerance” policy and repeal of the statute
of limitations, which it found “difªcult to reconcile” with Church notions
of due process and fairness. The Vatican also questioned the proposed
mandatory reporting of all sexual abuse claims to civil authorities, argu-
ing that it jeopardized bonds of trust between bishops and priests. Fi-
nally, the Vatican considered the proposed new deªnition of sexual abuse,
which included instances involving no physical force or direct contact,
unduly expansive.106 According to New York Times columnist Frank Bruni,
who has closely tracked the Catholic clergy abuse scandal for years, the
Vatican’s negative response stemmed from “[t]he way [American] bish-
ops had . . . ceded their authority and discretion, replacing individual
judgment with exacting prescriptions and opening the Roman Catholic
Church to scrutiny, and censure, from laypeople outside its hierarchy.”107
In mid-November 2002, U.S. Catholic bishops met to assess what
steps should be taken in the wake of the Vatican’s decision. They over-
whelmingly approved a slate of reforms generated by four U.S. bishops
and four Vatican ofªcials modifying those adopted in Dallas at the June
2002 meeting. The new policy requires that bishops refer abuse allega-
tions for investigation to sexual abuse boards created at the diocese level
that are to serve as “a consultative body to the bishop/eparch in discharging
his responsibilities.”108 Each review board is to include at least ªve indi-
viduals, serving ªve-year terms, with a majority of laypersons, but at least
one priest and one member having “particular expertise in the treatment
of the sexual abuse of minors.”109 When the board decides there is “sufª-
cient evidence” of sexual abuse, it must notify the Vatican-based Congre-
gation for the Doctrine of the Faith, which will decide whether to retain
jurisdiction over the case or to refer it back to U.S.-based tribunals made
up of Church clerics.110 Any priest found guilty by either of the closed-
door Church tribunals is to be stripped of his ministerial authority, but
may continue to receive ªnancial support and housing from the diocese.111
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ment of U.S. Abuse Plan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 2002, at A1.
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2002, at A1; see also Alan Cooperman, In Search of Clarity, and Fairness: Vatican Worries
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With respect to the reporting requirement, the bishops adopted a more
neutral stance, requiring that public authorities be advised of the alleged
abuse only if the civil law in a particular jurisdiction so requires.112 The
bishops also expressly prohibited the transfer of any priest or deacon who
“has committed an act of sexual abuse of a minor,”113 but they expressly
eschewed observance of “any particular deªnition” of sexual abuse “pro-
vided in civil law.”114 Finally, the bishops also resoundingly rejected a
measure to censure bishops who have shielded abusive priests through
the years,115 and agreed with the Vatican that the extant statute of limita-
tions should remain intact.116
Predictably, victims’ groups criticized the modiªed directives, seeing
them as considerably less ambitious than those proposed in Dallas. One
victim observed that “[t]he charter that was designed to make bishops more
accountable is going back into the secrecy of the courts run by the clergy.”117
Another added that “[t]he changes they have made will increase their own
discretion, their dependency on Rome and the secretiveness of the proc-
ess . . . . It’s still all about power, hierarchy and secrecy, the things that
have practically deªned the Roman Catholic Church since the 16th century.”118
In sum, ªve hundred years after its heyday in medieval England,
sanctuary has again inªltrated the public consciousness. And as during
the time of King James I, the state—after a long acquiescence—has re-
coiled and taken action to end it.
B. The Family
Like the Church, the institution of family has historically operated as
a self-governing entity outside the reach of the criminal law. Indeed, aside
from their coupling in the conservative vernacular, church and family
share a common social history and function, prompting one colonial-era
preacher to describe the family as “a little church, and a little common-
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Times, Nov. 14, 2002, at A1. In lieu thereof, the bishops would provide one another
“fraternal support, fraternal challenge and fraternal correction.” U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops, A Statement of Episcopal Commitment, available at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/
commit.htm (Nov. 13, 2002).
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 Goodstein, supra note 115. For more recent allegations of abuse, the period runs
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wealth.”119 The home, much like the Church, was seen as “a bastion of
peace, of repose, of orderliness.”120
History has irrefutably shown, however, that this outward image of
stability and self-regulating lawfulness, and the deference it inspired,
functioned to conceal horriªc physical and sexual abuse, which has endured
since Roman times in the shadows of governmental control. Roman civil
law, invoking the concept patria potestas, afforded husbands (and fa-
thers, as the case might be) plenary authority to deal with family mem-
bers without governmental interference.121 Patriarchs in Roman times, for
instance, were empowered to kill wives caught in the act of adultery.122
During the ªfteenth century, the Catholic Church showed husbands similar
deference by adopting the “Rules of Marriage,” which allowed husbands
to adjudicate alleged wifely offenses and issue beatings.123
This unwillingness to intervene in family life, in turn, was imported
to America. Although Puritans in colonial Massachusetts (1640–1680)
enacted the world’s ªrst laws prohibiting spouse and child abuse,124 the
law proved to have little effect. This was because, as Professor Elizabeth
Pleck notes, “Puritan courts placed family preservation ahead of physical
                                                                                                                             
119
 John Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in Changing Images
of the Family 43, 46 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979).
120
 Id. at 51; see also Linda J. Lacey, Mimicking the Words, But Missing the Message:
The Misuse of Cultural Feminist Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35
B.C. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1993) (observing that in the nineteenth century “[b]oth the church and
the family provided a retreat from the competitive atmosphere of the marketplace”).
121
 See Nan Oppenlander, The Evolution of Law and Wife Abuse, 3 Law & Pol’y Q.
382, 386 (1981); Michelle J. Nolder, Note, The Domestic Violence Dilemma: Private Ac-
tion in Ancient Rome and America, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 1119, 1122–32 (2001).
122
 See Nolder, supra note 121, at 1126 (discussing the law in effect at the time of Cato
the Elder (234–149 B.C.E.)).
123
 See Terry Davidson, Conjugal Crime: Understanding and Changing the
Wifebeating Pattern 99 (1978).
124
 See Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy
Against Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present 17–33 (1987). As
Professor Pleck notes:
The Puritans hoped that their “city upon a hill” would set an example of religious
devotion for the rest of the world. The family was vital to their endeavor; it con-
veyed religious values and prepared the young for a pious life . . . . An institution
so necessary to the Puritan mission could not become a sanctuary for cruelty and
violence; family violence was “wicked carriage”—assaultive and sinful behav-
ior—that threatened the individual’s and the community’s standing before God.
Only if the Puritans maintained their vigilance in punishing sin would God extend
to them his protection . . . . Moreover, family violence threatened the social and
political stability of the Puritan’s godly settlement.
Id. at 17. Ecclesiastic and civil courts alike heard cases involving all manner of familial
abuse. The former, in particular, sought reform, not punishment, of offenders. “The goal of
the hearing was not to determine innocence or guilt but to wring from the person on trial a
confession of sin in the hope of securing for the wayward soul the promise of salvation.”
Id. at 20. This coercive threat of intervention, at least for wives abusing children, was fur-
ther backed by the specter of being accused of witchcraft, an accusation not then taken
lightly. See id. at 19.
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protection of victims.”125 Puritan law explicitly justiªed “legitimate”
physical force of husbands and fathers against wives and children,126 and
even this limit was rarely enforced, out of reluctance to interfere in the
private domain of the family.127 Emblematic of this reluctance was the
American adoption of the common law “rule of thumb,” which author-
ized husbands to beat their wives with any instrument no thicker than
their thumbs,128 affording a marital privilege of “moderate chastisement.”129
In 1824, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, for instance, expressly per-
mitted a husband to chastise his wife “without being subjected to vexa-
tious prosecutions, resulting in the mutual discredit and shame of all par-
ties concerned.”130 Although the court expressed ambivalence, in the end
it refused to endorse criminal intervention out of “principle”:
However abhorrent to the feelings of every member of the bench,
must be the exercise of this remnant of feudal authority, to inºict
pain and suffering, when all the ªner feelings of the heart should
be warmed into devotion, by our most affectionate regards, yet
every principle of public policy and expediency . . . would seem
to require, the establishment of the rule we have laid down, in
order to prevent the deplorable spectacle of the exhibition of simi-
lar cases in our courts of justice.131
A similar view was advanced by the North Carolina Supreme Court
in 1852. Although constrained to admit that “a slap on the cheek . . . in-
deed any touching of the person of another in a rude or angry manner—is
in law an assault and battery,”132 it concluded that “in the nature of things
[the criminal law] cannot apply to persons in the marriage state.”133 The
court found that such application “would break down the great principle
of mutual conªdence and dependence; throw open the bedroom to the
gaze of the public; and spread discord and misery, contention and strife,
where peace and concord ought to reign.”134
                                                                                                                             
125
 Id. at 23.
126
 Id. at 25.
127
 Id. at 27–29.
128
 Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 157 (1824) (citing Blackstone for the
proposition that the chastisement right permits use of “a whip or rattan, no bigger than my
thumb, in order to inforce [sic] the salutary restraints of domestic discipline”).
129
 For an overview of the evolution of the privilege, and the closely linked deference
to family patriarchs and government itself, see R. Emerson Dobash & Russell Dobash,
Violence Against Wives: A Case Against the Patriarchy 48–74 (1979).
130








 Id. Sixteen years later, the same court dismissed a battery charge ªled against a
husband who gave his wife “three licks, with a switch about the size of one of his ªngers.”
State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 454 (1868). Again, while admitting that the
violence “would without question have constituted a battery if the subject had not been the
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The formal legal privilege of chastisement endured until 1871 when
Alabama and Massachusetts expressly proscribed “wife beating.”135 That
year, Alabama’s Supreme Court proclaimed that the chastisement privi-
lege, “ancient though it be, to beat [one’s wife] with a stick, to pull her
hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the ºoor, or to inºict upon
her like indignities, is now not acknowledged by our law.”136 For decades
thereafter, however, wife beating remained largely beyond the reach of the
criminal law, and the gap between the de jure and the de facto experi-
ences of American women remained signiªcant.137 Instead, government
contented itself with, at most, efforts to repair dysfunctional, violent family
situations. Further, in those instances when the criminal law was invoked,
prosecutions were typically reserved for immigrants and racial minorities.138
Child abuse, by mothers and fathers alike,139 similarly continued
without signiªcant intervention.140 The legal recognition of child abuse,
like spousal battery, did not occur until the 1870s—in the wake of the
Civil War—when government involvement in citizens’ lives increased
dramatically.141 The governmental focus on child abuse, like the focus on
spousal abuse, was largely class-centered,142 and it assumed tangible form
                                                                                                                             
defendant’s wife,” it was a matter best left to “family government.” Id. at 454, 456.
135
 Dobash & Dobash, supra note 129, at 63 (citing Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143
(1871), and Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458 (1871)).
136
 Fulgham, 46 Ala. at 146–47.
137
 See Pleck, supra note 124, at 182 (“There was virtually no public discussion of
wife beating from the turn of the century until the mid-1970s.”); Cathryn Jo Rosen, The
Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women
Who Kill, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 11, 12 (1986) (“[J]udicial recognition that men were no
longer legally justiªed in beating their wives did not readily translate into increased num-
bers of arrests or prosecutions for spousal assault and battery.”).
138
 See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2134–41 (1996).
139
 See Linda Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of
Family Violence, Boston, 1880–1960, at 173 (1988) (noting that “[p]ast and present,
parents of both sexes are approximately equally represented as child abusers,” but that
“fathers were much more likely to abuse children in proportion to how much time they
spend in child care”).
140
 See generally 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law
§§ 878–91 (Boston, Little Brown, 5th ed. 1872) (discussing the chastisement right in the
context of spouses and parents); Robert W. Ten Bensel et al., Children in a World of Vio-
lence: The Roots of Child Maltreatment, in The Battered Child 3 (Mary Edna Helfer et
al., 5th ed. 1997) (providing a comprehensive overview of various forms of child abuse
throughout history).
The precise degree of physical abuse suffered by children is the subject of ongoing
debate among historians. For a comprehensive review of the literature, supplemented by an
exhaustive historical review of primary sources, see Linda A. Pollock, Forgotten
Children: Parent-Child Relations from 1500–1900 (1983). Professor Pollock dis-
putes the accepted historical view that unremitting, severe child battering was widespread
but notes at length the endemic use of parental corporal punishment, most severe in the
nineteenth century. See id. at 143–202.
141
 Pleck, supra note 124, at 70–76. But see id. at 75 (“The general concern about the
suffering of children in the antebellum era was simply outweighed by the belief in the
privacy of the family.”).
142
 Gordon, supra note 139, at 28 (“[Reformers] saw cruelty to children as a vice of
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in the nationwide proliferation of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Children.143 In 1874, the ªrst child abuse prosecution was initiated
against one Mary Connolly for allegedly attacking her foster child with a
pair of scissors and repeatedly beating her with a rawhide whip and
cane.144 Connolly was convicted and her successful prosecution catalyzed
the children’s aid movement.145 Over the ensuing two decades, “chil-
dren’s guardian” boards were created, marking the ªrst concerted gov-
ernmental effort to intervene in the domestic sphere to address child abuse.
When Progressive Era government at last dedicated itself to ad-
dressing domestic harms to wives and children, it adopted a social cura-
tive approach. The government addressed spousal abuse in the ameliora-
tive forum of family courts, which viewed battery as a non-criminal of-
fense more amenable to mediation and counseling than to prosecution.146
Child-oriented reforms, in turn, emphasized the development of the juve-
nile court system and sought to repair abusive domestic relations, not to
prosecute parents.147 As a result, the system predominantly focused on
“neglect” not “abuse.”148
This ambivalent approach persisted for decades. Only in 1962, after
a landmark medical study reported that x-ray technology had discerned
hundreds of cases of otherwise unreported child abuse, did public atten-
tion turn to the issue.149 The article soberly reported that “the bones tell a
story the child is too young or too frightened to tell,”150 and urged that
                                                                                                                             
inferior classes and cultures which needed correction and ‘raising up’ to an ‘American’
standard.”); Pleck, supra note 124, at 70 (“[A] wealthy, urban elite was also fearful of
social disorder and dismayed by the poverty, disease, and lawlessness of urban life. They
blamed the immigrant, largely Catholic, poor and hoped to rescue their children from a life
of pauperism, drink, and petty thievery.”).
143
 Gordon, supra note 139, at 28; Pleck, supra note 124, at 72–74.
144
 Pleck, supra note 124, at 70–73. Signiªcantly, the case was initiated only at the
urging of the founder and president of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals. Id. at 72. According to Professor Pleck, “[a]nimal protection preceded child
protection not because the public was more concerned about animals than children, but
because child rescue involved interference in the fundamental unit of the family.” Id. at 79.
145
 Id. at 69–73.
146
 Id. at 136–42. See generally Ronald D. Cohen, Child-Saving and Progressivism,
1885–1915, in American Childhood: A Research Guide and Historical Handbook
273 (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner eds., 1985); Hamilton Cravens, Child Saving in
Modern America, 1870–1990s, in Children At Risk in America: History, Concepts,
and Public Policy 3 (Roberta Wollons ed., 1993).
147
 See The APSAC Handbook on Child Maltreatment 310 (John E. B. Myers et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); Pleck, supra note 124, at 70, 136–42. However, according to Eliza-
beth Pleck, “the agents of these societies often sided with cruel parents at the expense of
the child’s safety.” Pleck, supra note 124, at 70.
148
 See Pleck, supra note 124, at 81–85. The system’s response to allegations of incest
was even more ambivalent, labeling victims “juvenile sex delinquents,” casting “neglectful
mothers” as culprits, consciously focusing on “street rape” by strangers as opposed to
“household” rape. See Gordon, supra note 139, at 215–23. Nonetheless, arrests were
made in ªfty-seven percent of the cases reported to Boston’s child protection agency dur-
ing the period from 1880 to 1910. Id. at 217.
149
 See C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17 (1962).
150
 Id. at 18.
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physicians take action to protect children from further and potentially
lethal abuse.151 By 1967, due largely to the inºuence of a federal model
provision proposed in 1963, all states had enacted some form of manda-
tory child physical abuse reporting law for professionals.152 In the 1980s,
society awakened to child sexual abuse in particular.153 Today, all U.S.
jurisdictions have laws criminalizing child abuse and neglect,154 and re-
ported incidents of these crimes have skyrocketed over recent decades.155
Concern over spousal abuse lagged behind governmental willingness
to intervene on behalf of children. Public discussion and recognition of
battering was muted for the ªrst seven decades of the twentieth century,
with spousal abuse being euphemistically referred to as “domestic distur-
bance” or “family maladjustment.”156 Police, the gatekeepers of the jus-
tice system, unabashedly advocated non-arrest policies, believing that
interference in the private domestic realm was inappropriate. Rather than
promoting arrest, the police advanced the view that, if anything, media-
tion was in order.157 Training materials for the Oakland Police Depart-
ment, for instance, instructed that:
The police role in a dispute situation [is] more often that of a
mediator and peacemaker than enforcer of the law. . . . Normally,
ofªcers should adhere to the policy that arrests shall be avoided
. . . but when one of the parties demands arrest, you should at-
tempt to explain the ramiªcations of such action (e.g., loss of
                                                                                                                             
151
 Id. at 23–24. For an overview of initiatives and debates taking place with regard to
child physical abuse in the 1960s and 1970s, see Pleck, supra note 124, at 164–81.
152
 See Victor I. Vieth, Passover in Minnesota: Mandated Reporting and the Unequal
Protection of Abused Children, 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 131, 135 (1998). See generally
Seth C. Kalichman, Mandated Reporting of Suspected Child Abuse: Ethics, Law
and Policy (2d ed. 1999).
153
 See Penelope K. Trickett & Frank W. Putnam, Developmental Consequences of
Child Sexual Abuse, in Violence Against Children in the Family and the Commu-
nity 39, 39 (Penelope K. Trickett & Cynthia J. Schellenbach eds., 1998) (noting a dra-
matic increase in attention to child sexual abuse in the 1980s and 1990s); Katherine Beck-
ett, Culture and Politics of Signiªcation: The Case of Child Sexual Abuse, 43 Soc. Probs.
57 (1996) (same); D. Kelly Weisberg, The “Discovery” of Sexual Abuse: Experts’ Role in
Legal Policy Formulation, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 3–6 (1984) (same).
154
 See Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children From Exposure to Domestic Violence:
The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment, 53 Hastings L.J. 1, 19–23 (2001).
155
 See Vieth, supra note 152, at 135 (noting that from 1963 to 1995 the number of re-
ported cases of abuse and neglect increased from 150,000 to three million).
156
 Pleck, supra note 124, at 182.
157
 See Dobash & Dobash, supra note 129, at 207–17; Morton Bard & Joseph Zacker,
The Prevention of Family Violence: Dilemmas of Community Interaction, 33 J. Marriage
& Fam. 677, 677–82 (1971). See generally Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Domes-
tic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response (2d ed. 1996); Del Martin, Battered
Wives (1981); William Stacey & Anson Shupe, The Family Secret: Domestic Vio-
lence in America (rev. ed. 1983); Murray A. Straus et al., Behind Closed Doors:
Violence in the American Family (1980).
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wages, bail procedures, court appearances) and encourage the
parties to reason with each other.158
Likewise, prosecutors generously indulged their virtually unchecked
authority to abstain from prosecuting offenders.159 Moreover, even when
successfully prosecuted, abusers generally received only minor sen-
tences, often getting little more than a stern lecture from the court.160
The governmental reluctance to intervene rested on a variety of justiª-
cations. Chief among these was an abiding concern over the privacy and
autonomy interests of the family unit,161 which to varying degrees has
reºected and reinforced the underlying patriarchal power structure.162 The
family was seen as a private and autonomous entity, a realm in which the
government was “only too happy to avoid having either to forbid or to
require particular interpersonal behavior.”163 Courts recoiled from the
prospect of being called upon to handle “every triºing family broil,” and
dreaded “the evils which would result from raising the curtain and ex-
posing to public curiosity” family life.164 Later, in the twentieth century,
                                                                                                                             
158
 Martin, supra note 157, at 93–94 (quoting City of Oakland Police Servs.,
Training Bulletin III-J, Techniques of Dispute Intervention 2–3 (1975)); see also
Raymond I. Parnas, The Police Response to Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 914,
922–24 (describing the typical response of police prior to the 1970s and 1980s).
159
 See generally Dobash & Dobash, supra note 129, at 217–19; Deborah Epstein,
Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Role of Prosecutors,
Judges, and the Court System, 11 Yale J.L. & Feminism 3, 15–16 (1999); Kathleen Waits,
The Criminal Justice System’s Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging
the Solutions, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 267, 298–305 (1985).
160
 See generally Dobash & Dobash, supra note 129, at 219–22 (discussing modest
judicial sanctions).
161
 See Phillippe Aries, The Family and the City in the Old World and New, in
Changing Images of the Family 29, 33 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979)
(noting that with increasing industrialization, the family unit came to be revered as a ref-
uge, a “private domain, the only place where a person could legitimately escape the in-
quisitive stare of industrial society”); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497, 1499 (1983) (“[The] home
was said to provide a haven from the anxieties of modern life—a ‘shelter for those moral
and spiritual values which the commercial spirit and the critical spirit were threatening to
destroy’”) (quoting W. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830–1870, at 343
(1957) (emphasis omitted)). See generally Stephanie Coontz, The Social Origins of
Private Life: A History of American Families, 1600–1900 (1988).
162
 See R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The “Appropriate” Victims of
Marital Violence, 2 Victimology 426, 427 (1978) (calling wife-battering “a form of be-
havior which has existed for centuries as an acceptable, and, indeed, a desirable part of a
patriarchal family system within a patriarchal society . . . .”).
163
 Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1135, 1144–
45 (quoting Judith Hicks Stiehm, Government and The Family: Justice and Acceptance, in
Changing Images of the Family, supra note 161, at 361, 362); see also Zanita E. Fen-
ton, Mirrored Silence: Reºections on Judicial Complicity in Private Violence, 78 Or. L.
Rev. 995 (1999) (arguing that domestic violence and other forms of private violence are
reinforced by judicial inaction).
164
 State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 457–59 (1868).
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federal courts invoked constitutional law to shelter family privacy and
autonomy,165 contributing to and justifying reluctance to intervene.166
It was not until the 1970s that the “curtain” shielding spousal abuse
ªnally lifted,167 in signiªcant part due to successful feminist efforts to
make domestic abuse a public issue and successful lawsuits challenging
the failure of the criminal justice system to intervene in abusive situa-
tions.168 Signiªcant developments have included: increased statutory
                                                                                                                             
165
 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979) (rejecting procedural pro-
tections limiting parental discretion to commit children to institutions for the mentally
retarded, terming protections “statist” and contrary to “Western civilization concepts of the
family unit with broad parental authority over minor children”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (invalidating compulsory education for Amish children through
age sixteen, noting the “values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and educa-
tion” of children); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (invalidating a state
law prohibiting use by married persons of contraceptives, while referring to the institution
of marriage as “intimate to the degree of being sacred”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (invalidating a law prohibiting attendance at parochial schools,
concluding that the law “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”).
166
 For commentary on how the concept of marital privacy has permitted, and even en-
couraged, violence against women, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy,
23 Conn. L. Rev. 973 (1991). According to Professor Schneider:
By seeing woman-abuse as ‘private,’ we afªrm it as a problem that is individual,
that only involves a particular male-female relationship, and for which there is no
social responsibility to remedy . . . . Denial supports and legitimates [the power of
patriarchy]; the concept of privacy is a key aspect of this denial.
Id. at 983; see also id. at 984–85 (“Privacy says that violence against women is immune
from sanction, that it is permitted, acceptable and part of the basic fabric of American life.
Privacy says that what goes on in the violent relationship should not be the subject of state
or community intervention.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal
Law, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2151, 2158 (1995) (suggesting that deference to privacy is a ves-
tige of the traditional privilege of chastisement).
For a contrary view advocating privacy in familial relations, for women of color in
particular, see Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center 37 (1984) (as-
serting that family life allows black women to “experience dignity, self-worth, and a hu-
manization that is not experienced in the outside world”); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping
the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1257 (1991) (describing home as “a safe haven from the indignities of
life in a racist society”); Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The
Role of the State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1348, 1371 (1994) (deeming “family liberty” a basis
for promoting “full personhood”); see also Laura W. Stein, Living With the Risk of
Backªre: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of Privacy and Equality, 77 Minn. L. Rev.
1153, 1173 (1993) (identifying and advocating the beneªts of privacy, including autonomy,
personhood, and freedom from governmental interference).
167
 As Professor Reva Siegel has observed, judicial use of the curtain metaphor was not
accidental; during the nineteenth century heavily curtained windows, made available as a
result of advances in textile production, increasingly came to be used in homes. Siegel,
supra note 138, at 2168–69 & n.187.
168
 See generally Developments in the Law: Legal Reponses to Domestic Violence, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 1498 (1993). As Professor Katharine Baker has observed, the visibility of
domestic violence has been closely tied to the ebb and ºow of the various historic incarna-
tions of the women’s movement:
Thus, it was visible as an issue in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
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authority for police to execute warrantless arrests in the home; the en-
actment of mandatory arrest laws for domestic abuse; and most recently
“no drop” policies, which remove the discretionary authority of prose-
cutors (and victims) to forgo abuse prosecutions.169 Arguably, the zenith
of governmental recognition of spousal abuse came in 1994, when Con-
gress, after several years of intense lobbying, passed the Violence Against
Women Act, which contained a broad array of provisions ensuring and
enhancing legal remedies for abuse victims and provided incentives for
states to become more aggressive in enforcing domestic abuse laws.170
Viewed in a broader historical context, it is apparent that the will-
ingness of government to address family violence has varied considera-
bly over time, in close relation to transformative social interets. As Linda
Gordon has observed, “the very deªnition of what constitutes unaccept-
able domestic violence, and the appropriate responses to it, developed
and then varied according to political moods and the force of certain po-
litical movements.”171 The child-savers of the late eighteenth century
achieved the most marked success in eroding governmental reluctance to
intervene. Mindful of the close relationship between spousal and child
abuse,172 they in turn partnered with the temperance and nascent women’s
movements, and later the feminist movement, to compel governmental
involvement in the previously self-governing private domain of the fam-
ily.
However, as discussed later, despite the increasing de jure recogni-
tion of family violence and the government’s increased readiness to in-
tervene, use of criminal sanctions has demonstrably failed to stem the
tide of domestic harms. Indeed, with the passage of time, the law’s
inefªciency has become manifest with respect to newly recognized forms
of family-based abuse, including that involving the elderly,173 and lesbian,
                                                                                                                             
ries, but, with no vibrant feminist community to articulate its harms, it died out as
an issue for most of the middle part of the twentieth century. It was not until the
early 1970s, with the rise of the second wave of feminism, that activists and
newspapers began to make the issue real again.
Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 Yale L.J. 1459, 1462 (2001).
169
 See generally Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence,
1970–1990, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 46 (1992) (chronicling and discussing changes).
170
 See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001–40703,
108 Stat. 1902 (codiªed as amended in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.). The Su-
preme Court later signiªcantly undercut the substantive import of the law when it held that
Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause and section ªve of the Four-
teenth Amendment by creating in the Act a federal civil remedy for persons victimized by
gender-motivated violence. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
171
 Gordon, supra note 139, at 3; see also Pleck, supra note 124, at 4–5 (“Reform
against family violence has mainly occurred as a response to social and political condi-
tions, rather than to worsening conditions in the home.”).
172
 See Gordon, supra note 139, at 261 (noting that “41 percent of wife-beaters were
also child abusers”).
173
 See generally Audrey S. Garªeld, Elder Abuse and the States’ Adult Protective Serv-
ices Response: Time for a Change in California, 42 Hastings L.J. 859 (1991); Seymour
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gay, bisexual, and transgender persons.174 Additionally, numerous ves-
tiges of the historic aversion to policing family life have extended into
modern times. Marital rape, as of the mid-1980s, largely remained a legal
impossibility,175 with the drafters of the inºuential Model Penal Code
expressing concern over “unwarranted intrusion of the penal law into the
life of the family.”176 Corporal punishment of children remains a recog-
nized prerogative of parents, such that prisoners enjoy greater protection
from bodily violence than children.177 Similarly, at times child abuse (but
more often neglect) is condoned on the basis of religious belief, with the
State deferring to the First Amendment rights of parents or religious
communities.178 Evidentiary law also continues to betray an age-old re-
luctance to interfere; the spousal privilege, for instance, prohibits the
government from compelling the testimony of a battered spouse, should
prosecution ensue.179 As noted by one commentator, the law, by distin-
                                                                                                                             
Moskowitz, Saving Granny From the Wolf: Elder Abuse and Neglect—The Legal Frame-
work, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 77 (1998).
174
 See generally Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic
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Rape: A Higher Standard is in Order, 1 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 183, 194–97 (1994)
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 See generally Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal
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Rev. 267 (1985).
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guishing domestic harm from others, “send[s] an obvious message: When
a man beats his wife it is not a crime that offends the state—it is simply a
private matter between the two of them.”180
In sum, family abuse and violence has been met with an ambivalent
response from government over time. The family, as Professor Teitel-
baum has observed, has existed as “an institution simultaneously deªned
by, and separate from, the state.”181 “By regarding the family as an entity
which is left free by governmental silence, the effects of a policy permit-
ting personal domination are obscured.”182 Tragically, through the years,
these “effects” have assumed the form of criminal predations, perpetrated
in the shadow of public law.
C. The Corporation
In this era of hyper-sensitization to corporate wrongdoing, it is hard to
imagine a time when corporations enjoyed criminal immunity. Such a
time, however, surely existed, stemming from the basic fact that corpora-
tions are artiªcial legal constructs,183 with “no soul to be damned, and no
body to be kicked.”184 In the words of historian William Holdsworth, cor-
porations “could commit neither sin nor crime; and some said no tort—
truly suitable representatives for saints and churches.”185 As a result of
this doctrinal barrier, the corporation, excluding its individual employees
and agents, stood beyond the reach of the criminal law, from the time of
the ªrst recognition of the corporation in fourteenth-century England, as
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supra note 163, at 1174.
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 Teitelbaum, supra note 163, at 1178.
183
 See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodard, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)
(describing a corporation as “an artiªcial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law”); Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86
(1809) (describing a corporation as “[t]hat invisible, intangible and artiªcial being, that
mere legal entity”).
184
 King, supra note 3, at 1; see also Case of Sutton’s Hosp., 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973
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 3 Holdsworth, supra note 57, at 474; see also 1 Pollock & Maitland, supra
note 26, at 490 (“[T]he corporation is invisible, incorporeal, immortal; it cannot be as-
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an ecclesiastic entity,186 through centuries of its evolution as a mercantile
and industrial entity.187 As proclaimed by the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court in 1841: “It is a doctrine then, in conformity with the demands of
justice, and a proper distinction between the innocent and the guilty, that
when a crime or misdemeanor is committed under color of corporate
authority, the individuals acting in the business, and not the corporation
should be indicted.”188
Much as with the institutions of family and church, however, gov-
ernment over time became more willing to impose criminal liability on
corporations,189 which were proliferating in number190 and increasingly
liberated from the individualized legislative charters that delimited their
initial activities.191 Early government intervention took the form of nui-
sance indictments of quasi-corporate entities such as municipalities for
failure to maintain transportation-related infrastructure.192 In 1834, for
example, the City of Albany, New York, was indicted for permitting the
Hudson River basin to become mired in debris.193 New York’s highest court
concluded:
It is well settled that when a corporation or an individual are
[sic] bound to repair a public highway or navigable river, they
are [sic] liable to indictment for the neglect of their [sic] duty.
An indictment and an informotion [sic] are the only remedies to
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which the public can resort for a redress of their [sic] grievances
in this respect.194
Soon, commercial corporations came to be held accountable under nui-
sance for failing to uphold similarly assumed public duties to maintain
roads and bridges.195
Early liability was thus imposed for nonfeasance, avoiding the prac-
tical difªculty of ascribing intentional misbehavior to a ªctive entity. As
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court maintained, a corporation “can neither
commit a crime or misdemeanor, by any positive or afªrmative act, or
incite others to do so, as a corporation.”196 However, the law soon buckled
under the strain of administering the variable misfeasance-nonfeasance
distinction between harms afªrmatively done and those merely permitted
to occur.197 In the 1850s, American courts for the ªrst time began to es-
chew this distinction, and in the process tacitly recognized that corpora-
tions were legally capable of perpetrating active harms.198 During the
time, civil liability for intentional torts became possible.199 However, crimi-
nal liability largely remained limited to nuisance, with injunctive relief in
the form of abatement being the goal.200 Other, intent-based crimes re-
mained off-limits.201
It was not until the mid-1870s, at the same time that criminal law
became less tolerant of familial abuse,202 that corporations became sub-
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Friedman, A History of American Law 166–67, 446 (1973); James Willard Hurst,
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1780–1970, at 17–18 (1970); Chayes, supra note 186, at vii.
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 See, e.g., Morris & Essex, 23 N.J.L. at 370.
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ject to prosecutions for intent-based crimes. State courts demonstrated
the initial willingness to allow the prosecution of corporations for com-
mon law crimes previously applied only to individuals.203 Shortly there-
after, against a backdrop of Progressive Era legislative reforms targeting
dubious corporate economic dealings,204 the federal courts also began im-
posing liability on corporate entities for intent-based crimes.205 Signiªcant-
ly, for the ªrst time, corporations faced criminal liability for homicide.206
Shadowing the increasing predisposition of the civil law to hold or-
ganizations collectively liable,207 turn-of-the-century courts frequently
sought to neutralize their conceptual discomfort by invoking agency and
tort law principles of vicarious liability. As a result, corporations were
held responsible for the acts of their employees. In the seminal 1909 case
of New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States,208 for
instance, the Supreme Court upheld a railroad’s conviction and ªne under
the Elkins Act for the ªnancial misdeeds of its employees.209 The Court
rejected the argument that punishing the corporation for the acts of its
subordinates was unconstitutional because it in effect punished share-
holders, depriving them of their property without due process of law.210
The Court found no valid reason “why [a] corporation which proªts [from a]
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transaction, and can only act through its agents and ofªcers, [cannot] be
held punishable by ªne because of the knowledge and intent of its agents
to whom it has entrusted authority to act . . . .”211 While noting that there
are “some crimes, which in their nature cannot be committed by corpo-
rations,” the Court emphasized that in doctrinal terms vicarious liability
permitted liability in a “large class of offenses . . . wherein the crime con-
sists in purposely doing the things prohibited by statute. In that class of
crimes we see no good reason why corporations may not be held respon-
sible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of their agents.”212
The Court also recognized the compelling pragmatic need for corpo-
rate criminal accountability: “If it were not so, many offenses might go
unpunished and acts be committed in violation of law, where, as in the
present case, the statute requires all persons, corporate or private, to re-
frain from certain practices . . . .”213 In short, the law could not “shut its
eyes” to the increasingly pervasive role of corporations in American life;214
the continued provision of criminal immunity “would virtually take away
the only means of effectually controlling” corporate wrongdoing.215 To
the Court, criminal liability for individual corporate actors held out only
partial hope of preventing and punishing violations of law. Concurrent
criminal liability for corporations best ensured the accomplishment of
legislative goals.216
At about the same time, courts became less respectful of the doctrine
of ultra vires, which precluded corporate liability for the criminal acts of
agents by dictating that corporate liabilities were delimited by corporate
charters.217 This shift, in turn, precluded corporations from arguing that
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they were criminally immune for injurious acts of their agents that they
did not expressly authorize.218
A ªnal important development in the early twentieth century was the
enactment of laws targeting “public welfare” offenses,219 which imposed
strict liability regardless of intent, and obviated the need to attribute
mens rea to a ªctive entity. The criminal law also came to expressly in-
clude corporations within its ambit, further reducing the need to anthro-
pomorphize. As one federal court stated early in the century, “[t]he same
law that creates the corporation may create the crime, and to assert that
the Legislature cannot punish its own creature because it cannot make a
creature capable of violating the law does not . . . bear discussion.”220
In short, by the early 1900s, legislators and judges realized that the
criminal law required modiªcation to properly account for wrongs com-
mitted by increasingly powerful and prevalent corporate collectives.221 As
the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in 1917, in upholding a homicide
indictment against a corporation in the face of explicit statutory reference
to “persons”:
We need not consider whether the modiªcation of the common
law by our decisions is to be justiªed by logical argument: it is
confessedly a departure at least from the broad language in which
the earlier deªnitions were stated, and a departure made neces-
sary by changed conditions if the criminal law was not to be set
at naught in many cases by contriving that the criminal act
should be in law the act of a corporation.222
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Accordingly, corporations, long the beneªciary of State protection, in-
cluding the constitutional protections of a “person,” assumed the associ-
ated potential criminal liabilities.223
This shift in legal discourse was mirrored in broader American soci-
ety, which for the ªrst time focused in earnest on corporate malefactors.
Writing in a time when muckraking journalists skewered the wrongdoing
of robber barons and other elites, sociologist E. A. Ross, for instance,
identiªed the “criminaloid,” who operated outside the constraints of law:
The man who picks pockets with a railway rebate, murders with
an adulterant instead of a bludgeon, burglarizes with a “rake-
off” instead of a jimmy, cheats with a company prospectus in-
stead of a deck of cards, or scuttles his town instead of his ship,
does not feel on his brow the brand of a malefactor.224
In the 1930s, folk singer Woody Guthrie, with characteristic populist ºair,
noted that “[s]ome will rob you with a six gun, [a]nd some with a foun-
tain pen.”225 In late 1939, Edwin Sutherland, widely considered the pro-
genitor of modern criminology, coined the phrase “white collar criminal”
in his presidential address to the American Sociological Society. A year
later he wrote of “crime in the upper or white-collar class, composed of
respectable or at least respected business and professional men . . . .”226
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Although diverse in form, the crimes shared a “violation of delegated or
implied trust.”227 Ten years later, Sutherland published his monumental
study of the criminal activity of seventy major U.S. corporations, chroni-
cling widespread and persistent corporate wrongdoing.228
This increasing social and legal recognition of corporate criminality,
however, failed to spark signiªcant prosecutorial resolve over the ensuing
decades.229 The situation prompted one commentator to observe in the
pages of the Harvard Business Review that the “systematic immunity” of
corporations qualiªed as the “profound political problem of all capitalist
nations in our century.”230 The commentator added that while “[i]n theory
[corporations] are creatures of the law; in practice they are beyond it.”231
In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Admini-
stration of Justice reported that “the public tends to be indifferent to busi-
ness crime or even to sympathize with the offenders when they have been
caught.”232 In 1975, Christopher Stone published Where the Law Ends: The
Social Control of Corporate Behavior, questioning, “[e]xactly what is it
about corporations, and exactly what is it about the institutions we have
available to control them, that so often seems to leave the one so frus-
tratingly outside the grasp of the other?”233
In 1978, however, a single event triggered a radical change in
Americans’ tolerance for corporate wrongdoing. Much as Father Paul
Shanley catalyzed action against pedophile priests in 2002, and Mary
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language—the “utility” of corporate criminal liability. See Kathleen Brickey, Rethinking
Corporate Criminal Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 593 (1988).
230
 John F. A. Taylor, Is the Corporation Above the Law?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr.
1965, at 119, 128.
231
 Id. at 128–29.
232
 President’s Comm’n on Law Enforcement & Admin. of Justice, The Chal-
lenge of Crime in a Free Society 158 (1968); see also Vilhelm Aubert, White-Collar
Crime and Social Structure, 58 Am. J. Soc. 265, 265 (1952).
233
 Christopher D. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Cor-
porate Behavior xii (1975); cf. Harvey Katz, The White Collar Criminal, Washingto-
nian, May 1970, at 40, 65 (quoting a District of Columbia trial judge as saying he would
“not penalize a businessman trying to make a living when there are felons out on the
street”).
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Connelly against abusive parents in 1870, the ªery deaths in August 1978
of three teenage girls in their Ford Pinto propelled corporate wrongdoing
to center stage.234 Ford marketed the Pinto knowing that the vehicle’s gas
tank was susceptible to rupture and explosion when hit from behind,235
reasoning that the civil verdicts likely resulting would not outweigh the
expected cost-savings associated with continued use of the ºawed de-
sign.236 As a result of Ford’s decision, ªve hundred people burned to
death in Pintos.237 The deaths of the three Indiana teenagers prompted a
rural prosecutor to seek an indictment for reckless homicide and, for the
ªrst time in American history, a grand jury returned an indictment
against a corporation for a non-negligent killing.238
Although Ford faced a maximum $30,000 ªne, the prospect of a
criminal conviction prompted it to undertake an aggressive, hugely ex-
pensive defense, replete with distinguished experts and outside counsel
assembled from throughout the nation.239 Ultimately, Ford was acquitted
after a ten-week trial, requiring twenty-ªve jury ballots, after managing
to suppress all but a small fraction of the damning arsenal of documen-
tary evidence secured by the prosecution.240 Despite the outcome, the
gruesome facts of the case and Ford’s callous decision to put proªts
ahead of safety galvanized public concern over corporate misdeeds and
inspired other prosecutions for corporate killings in the late 1970s and
1980s.241 Corporate misfeasance in the workplace, resulting in workers’
deaths and serious injuries, likewise inspired increased prosecutorial at-
tention during the time.242 In addition, nonfatal corporate wrongs pro-
                                                                                                                             
234
 For a discussion of how particular events serve to catalyze criminal justice re-
sponses, in particular, see Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in
Contemporary Politics (1997); Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic
Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 1227 (2000);
Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 Harv. J. on Legis. 527 (1996).
235
 Donald J. Meister, Criminal Liability for Corporations That Kill, 64 Tul. L. Rev.
919, 928 (1990) (citing Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, Mother Jones, Sept.-Oct. 1977, at
20, 24).
236
 Id. In 1965, consumer advocate Ralph Nader had chronicled a similar bottom-line
callousness by General Motors, which marketed its Corvair with knowledge of serious
safety ºaws that could have been remedied with the inclusion of an inexpensive design
change. See Ralph Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed (1965).
237
 Dowie, supra note 235, reprinted in Corporate Violence 13, 14 (Stuart L. Hills
ed. 1987).
238
 See Cullen et al., supra note 186, at 178.
239
 See id. at 245–57 (describing Ford’s legal defense team, including renowned jury
expert Professor Hans Zeisel of the University of Chicago).
240
 Id. at 292–93.
241
 See Meister, supra note 235, at 929–30; David J. Reilly, Murder, Inc.: The Criminal
Liability of Corporations for Homicide, 18 Seton Hall L. Rev. 378, 389–96 (1988).
242
 See Cullen et al., supra note 186, at 313–16 (citing and discussing corporate
homicide criminal prosecutions in the 1980s); David von Ebers, The Application of Crimi-
nal Homicide Statutes to Work-Related Deaths: Mens Rea and Deterrence, 1986 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 969; Peter T. Edelman, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The Need to
Punish Both the Corporate Entity and Its Ofªcers, 92 Dick. L. Rev. 193 (1987). Perhaps
the most infamous instance of corporate homicide involved the successful prosecution of
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vided grist for numerous high-proªle prosecutions in the 1980s, includ-
ing against Exxon for its environmentally disastrous oil spill in Alaskan
waters.243
This attention to corporate wrongdoing was not limited to prosecu-
tors and the public. In the late 1980s, recognizing widespread corporate
impunity244 and the otherwise scant245 or disparate246 punishments meted
out to corporations and agents alike, Congress undertook a major reex-
amination of white-collar criminal sanctions, including corporate and or-
ganizational liability.247 The hearings, however, triggered a ªrestorm of
controversy from interest groups,248 which discouraged inclusion of cor-
porate sanctions in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which took effect in
1987.249
                                                                                                                             
Film Recovery Systems for involuntary manslaughter, and three managers for murder, as a
result of an employee’s death from cyanide poisoning. See Jay C. Magnuson & Gareth C.
Leviton, Policy Considerations in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions After People v. Film
Recovery Systems, Inc., 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913 (1987).
243
 In 1991, Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping pled guilty to federal criminal
charges and paid a $150 million criminal ªne in connection with the massive spill. Rus-
sell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Corporate Predators 136 (1999). See generally
Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime:
How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 405, 408 (1993)
(“Beginning in the mid-1970s . . . the federal government began targeting white collar
crime as a high-priority prosecutorial area.”).
244
 See Nat’l Inst. of Law Enforcement & Criminal Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Illegal Corporate Behavior xxv (1979) (“[A]pproximately two-thirds of large
corporations violated the law, some of them many times.”); Mark A. Cohen, Corporate
Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988–
1990, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 247, 252 (1991) (noting that between 1984 and 1987, only forty-one
publicly traded ªrms nationwide were prosecuted for federal crimes).
245
 See John E. Conklin, “Illegal But Not Criminal”: Business Crime in Amer-
ica 100–29 (1977); Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Study of Social
Harms and Sentencing Practice in Federal Courts, 1984–1987, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 605,
618 (1989). According to one Congressional study, ªnes were so modest that they could
readily “be written off as a cost of doing business.” See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 76 (1983),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259. In 1985, sixty-ªve percent of Americans
polled viewed sentences for white-collar defendants as too lenient. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Source Book on Criminal Justice Statistics tbl.
2.23, at 162 (1985).
246
 This disparity existed with respect to sentences for similar crimes and between in-
dividual and organizational offenders. See Illene H. Nagel & John L. Hagan, The Sentenc-
ing of White-Collar Criminals in Federal Courts: A Socio-Legal Exploration of Disparity,
80 Mich. L. Rev. 1427 (1982).
247
 See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Com-
pliance, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1343, 1353 n.43 (1999).
248
 See Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations,
71 B.U. L. Rev. 315, 316–17 (1991) (noting that the Sentencing Commission’s proposals
“for organizational sanctions . . . [were] politically oriented, rather than policy oriented.
Indeed, if nothing else, the process of establishing sentencing guidelines has made it clear
that the work of the Sentencing Commission has entered the realm of special-interest poli-
tics”). See generally John P. Heinz et al., Legislative Politics and the Criminal Law, 64
Nw. U. L. Rev. 277 (1969).
249
 An additional factor leading to this inaction was the fact that the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984, which authorized promulgation of the Guidelines, contained no speciªc
directive with regard to organizations. The sole exception involved sentencing of organiza-
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In 1991, after considering proposals from three advisory bodies com-
posed of distinct interest groups,250 Congress at last adopted the Sen-
tencing Guidelines for Organizations. The Guidelines were designed “so
that sanctions imposed upon organizations and their agents, taken to-
gether, would provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incen-
tives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing,
detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.”251 The Guidelines themselves
are marked by an avowedly pragmatic “carrot and stick” approach. Ac-
cording to the Chair of Sentencing Commission, U.S. Circuit Judge Di-
ana Murphy, “[p]unishment is thus not the ultimate purpose of the or-
ganizational guidelines . . . . Rather, their ultimate purpose is the promo-
tion of good corporate citizenship through encouraging implementation
of effective compliance programs, which—it is hoped, will prevent
crime.”252 To this end, the Guidelines contain an intricate array of sanc-
tions, including signiªcantly increased ªnes, restitution, community
service, public notices to effectuate “shaming,” and probation terms. The
sanctions, in turn, are complemented by incentives for corporations to
institute internal compliance programs that can allow for reduced culpa-
bility in the event criminal activity is detected.253
                                                                                                                             
tions for antitrust violations. See Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 697, 699
n.6 (2002).
250
 See id. at 701 n.19.
251
 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch.8, introductory cmt. (2002); see also id.
§ 1A(4)(d) (“Under pre-guidelines sentencing practice, courts sentenced to probation an
inappropriately high percentage of offenders guilty of certain economic crimes . . . that in
the Commission’s view are ‘serious.’”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 376
(1989) (noting that the Guidelines sought to rectify the “too lenient” treatment of “major
white-collar criminals”).
252
 Murphy, supra note 249, at 706. For representative provisions concerning the role
of corporate entity compliance programs, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 8C2.5(f) (2002) (providing for mitigation if an offense occurred “despite an effective
program to prevent and detect violations of law”); id. § 8C2.5(g) (providing for mitigation
if an entity reported an offense prior to the immediate threat of revelation or government
intervention); id. § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(c) (stating that the effectiveness of a compliance pro-
gram depends on whether the entity exercised “due diligence in seeking to prevent and
detect criminal conduct by its employees and other agents . . . .”); id. § 8C2.5(f) (stating
that no mitigation is available if “an individual within high-level personnel of the organi-
zation” participated in or was willfully ignorant of the occurrence of the offense). See gen-
erally Kevin B. Huff, The Role of Corporate Compliance Programs in Determining Corpo-
rate Criminal Liability: A Suggested Approach, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1252 (1996); Charles
J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Li-
ability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul?, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 605 (1995). These same
values are reºected in the Justice Department’s internal guidelines regarding the charging
of corporations, which advise prosecutors to consider inter alia the seriousness of the of-
fense, the corporation’s history of similar conduct, the existence and adequacy of the cor-
poration’s compliance programs, the corporation’s cooperation and voluntary disclosure,
and the corporation’s remedial actions, if any. See Memorandum from U.S. Deputy Attor-
ney General, to all Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges
against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/
policy/Chargingcorps.html.
253
 For an overview of available sanctions in the corporate sentencing guidelines, see
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Still, despite the principled and practical reasons driving increased
governmental willingness to impose corporate criminal liability, liability
has remained controversial.254 Writing in 1957, for instance, one com-
mentator concluded that corporate criminal liability “has proceeded
without rationale whatsoever . . . . It simply rests on an assumption that
such liability is a necessary and useful thing.”255 Professor Albert Al-
schuler has likened corporate liability to the ancient practice of deo-
dand,256 arguing that “[a]ttributing intention and blame to an artiªcial
                                                                                                                             
Richard S. Gruner, Towards an Organizational Jurisprudence: Transforming Corporate
Criminal Law Through Federal Sentencing Reform, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 407 (1994); Illene H.
Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations:
Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future,
71 Wash. U. L.Q. 205 (1993). For a discussion of corporate liability with respect to envi-
ronmental-based criminal harms in particular, see Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime
and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Fed-
eral Environmental Statutes, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1054 (1992); Timothy F.
Malloy, Regulating By Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 531
(2002); Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1181 (1998).
254
 See, e.g., George F. Canªeld, Corporate Responsibility for Crime, 14 Colum. L.
Rev. 469 (1914); Joseph F. Francis, Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 305 (1924); Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 Harv. L. Rev.
404 (1916); Frederic P. Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1928).
255
 Gerhard Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 23
(1957). For more recent arguments in this same vein, see Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraak-
man, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687 (1997); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J.
Legal Stud. 319 (1996); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?:
The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 355 (1999); John J. Flynn, The Juris-
prudence of Corporate Personhood: The Misuse of a Legal Concept, in Corporations
and Society: Power and Responsibility 131 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller
eds., 1987); William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 Emory L.J. 647
(1994).
256
 See Black’s Law Dictionary 436 (6th ed. 1990) (deªning deodand as “any per-
sonal chattel which was the immediate occasion of the death of any reasonable creature,
and which was to be forfeited to the crown to be applied to pious uses”). Holmes provided
as an example of “deodand” a fallen tree that crushed a person, requiring that the tree itself
be “delivered to the relatives, or chopped to pieces for the gratiªcation of a real or simu-
lated passion.” Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 11 (Boston, Little Brown &
Co. 1990) (1881). For a fuller discussion of the historical origins and practice of deodand,
see Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, For-
feitures, Wrongful Death and the Notion of Sovereignty, 46 Temp. L.Q. 169 (1977);
Marilyn A. Katz, Ox-Slaughter and Goring Oxen: Homicide, Animal Sacriªce and Judicial
Process, 4 Yale J.L. & Human. 249 (1992). Of course, traditional admiralty law, and for-
feitures today, owe much to deodand principles and practice. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974).
The targeting of corporations, in addition to their agents, also resembles the ancient
practice of criminal prosecutions of nonhuman objects—animate and inanimate—for
harms caused to humans. See Paul S. Berman, Rats, Pigs, and Statues on Trial: The Crea-
tion of Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals and Inanimate Objects, 69
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 288 (1994). According to Berman, such trials helped foster the notion that
the world was rational, uniªed, and subject to accountability. Id. at 290–93. “Cultures have
ascribed guilt even where there is no real belief that the object could manifest intent or
malice. Grafting a notion of moral blame onto random misfortunes is a symbolic way of
understanding and conceptualizing pain.” Id. at 294; cf. Anita Bernstein, How Can a Prod-
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person is no wiser than attributing intention and blame to a dagger, a
fountain pen, a Chevrolet, or any other instrumentality of crime.”257 Ac-
cording to Alschuler, “[o]ur efforts to stigmatize aggregations of people,
most of whom are blameless, are unjustiªed in principle and may be less
effective in practice than civil alternatives would be.”258
The substantive criminal law has surmounted this basic ontological
barrier by borrowing from tort principles of vicarious liability, using two
basic strategies to impute liability to corporations.259 While both require
that the corporation beneªt to some degree as a result of the illegal act,
they differ in terms of the employee-wrongdoer’s position in the corpo-
ration. The most popular approach is based on respondeat superior doc-
trine, which imputes liability for harms caused by the criminal act of an
employee, acting within the scope of her employment (or with apparent
authority), regardless of the employee’s position in the corporation and of
whether the act is contrary to express corporate directive.260 The alterna-
tive, more conservative approach, adopted by the Model Penal Code,
makes a corporate entity liable only if the illegal act is “authorized, re-
quested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of
directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corpora-
tion within the scope of his ofªce or employment.”261 More recently,
                                                                                                                             
uct Be Liable?, 45 Duke L.J. 1 (1995) (reasoning that “product dynamism” accounts for
the vernacular tendency of law to impute tort liability to a harmful product, as opposed to
the manufacturer, seller, or supplier). Professor Bernstein traces the modern evolution of
the idea of product as wrongdoer to the French concept of fait de la chose, recognized in
1897, translated as the “act of the thing.” Bernstein, supra, at 40. Originated at a time
when commercial products were increasingly available due to rapid industrialization, the
legal trope shares a kindred lineage with corporate criminal liability, a legal innovation
necessitated by increased industrialization.
257
 Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frank-
pledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 307, 312–13 (1991).
258
 Id. at 311–12; see also Glanville Williams, Salmond on Jurisprudence § 119, at
366–68 (11th ed. 1957). But see Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility,
36 Yale L.J. 827, 841–42 (1927):
[A]ny distinction between acts which can, and acts which cannot, be done vicari-
ously, is illogical; logically, everything or nothing can be done vicariously . . . .
While corporations are not apt to commit rape, there is no inherent difªculty
about it . . . . It is submitted that there is no crime which corporations should be
regarded as incapable of committing, unless one created by a statute which is
clearly aimed at human beings only.
259
 As at common law, individual agents of corporations can be held criminally liable
in their personal capacities. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.07(6)(a) (1985) (“A person
is legally accountable for any conduct he performs or causes to be performed in the name
of the corporation . . . or in its behalf to the same extent as if it were performed in his own
name or behalf.”).
260
 See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972) (con-
viction of a corporation for an antitrust violation based on an agent’s illegal behavior that
was contrary to policy); The President Coolidge, 101 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939) (conviction
of a corporation for water pollution based on illegal dumping by kitchen worker).
261
 Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c) (1985).
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courts and commentators have advanced other doctrines to facilitate im-
putation of corporate mens rea, by means of “corporate ethos”262 and
“collective entity.”263
Notwithstanding these advances in substantive criminal law, basic
ideological differences persist over the threshold normative matter of
criminal liability itself. Calamities such as the 1984 mass poisoning in
Bhopal, India by Union Carbide;264 Morton-Thiokol’s involvement in the
Challenger space shuttle explosion in 1986;265 Imperial Food’s involve-
ment in the 1991 burning deaths of workers in a chicken processing plant
in Hamlet, North Carolina;266 and the role of SabreTech in the 1996
ValuJet air crash in Florida267 each involved conscious risk resulting in
the loss of life. However, to this day, commentators disagree over whether
the fatal wrongdoing was best redressed by civil or criminal means.268
Ambivalence is even apparent among law-and-order conservatives, who
while otherwise lauding aggressive prosecution of criminal wrongdoing,
                                                                                                                             
262
 See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Crimi-
nal Liability, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095 (1991). According to Professor Bucy, corporations
have an ethos: the “abstract, and intangible, character of a corporation separate from the
substance of what it actually does, whether manufacturing, retailing, ªnance or other ac-
tivity.” Id. at 1123. Ethos evolves by formal and informal means and is unique to each
organization, “identiªable, observable and malleable.” Id. at 1127. Ethos can thus inform
and encourage conduct by employee-agents, serving as a basis to impute liability. Id. For
an earlier yet similar characterization, see Charles C. Abbott, The Rise of the Busi-
ness Corporation 2 (1936) (“[A] corporation has a personality of its own distinct from
the personalities which compose it, a ‘group personality’ different from and greater than its
constiuent individualities. . . . [T]he whole is greater than the sum of the parts.”).
263
 See United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). Un-
der this view, corporations are not permitted to escape liability on the basis of “subdividing
the elements of speciªc duties and operations into smaller components.” Id. at 856. Rather,
the corporation is presumed to have acquired the “collective knowledge” of its employees
and is held responsible for their failure to heed the law. Id.
264
 See Cathy Trost, Bhopal Disaster Spurs Debate Over Usefulness of Criminal Sanc-
tions in Industrial Accidents, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1985, at 6.
265
 See Russell Boisjoly et al., The Challenger Disaster: Organizational Demands and
Personal Ethics, in Corporate and Governmental Deviance: Problems of Organ-
izational Behavior in Contemporary Society 207 (M. David Ermann et al. eds., 5th
ed. 1996).
266
 See Judy Root Aulette & Raymond Michalowski, Fire in Hamlet: A Case Study of
State-Corporate Crime, in White-Collar Crime: Classic and Contemporary Views
166 (Gilbert Geis et al. eds., 3d ed. 1995).
267
 See Catherine Wilson, Firm Convicted in ValuJet Crash: Maintenance Company
Mishandled Canisters, Denver Post, Dec. 7, 1999, at A3, 1999 WL 27564307.
268
 For discussions of how social construction of corporation-caused harms as criminal
serves to blur the traditional bounds of civil and criminal liability, see Pamela H. Bucy, The
Poor Fit of Traditional Evidentiary Doctrine and Sophisticated Crime: An Empirical
Analysis of Health Care Fraud Prosecutions, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 383 (1994); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”? Reºections on the Disappearing Tort/
Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193 (1991). On the process of social
construction of corporate criminality more generally, see John P. Wright et al., The Social
Construction of Corporate Violence: Media Coverage of the Imperial Food Products Fire,
41 Crime & Delinq. 20 (1995). For a list of particularly notable criminal misdeeds in
recent times, see Russell Mokhiber, Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade, at
http:/www.corporatepredators.org/top100.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2003).
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express reservations when it comes to corporations—creating what one
commentator has aptly labeled “the white collar paradox.”269
Moreover, as discussed at greater length below, there remain basic
empirical questions over the efªcacy of the criminal law as a deterrent
force vis-à-vis corporations. According to the Vice Chair of the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission:
There apparently [are] no empirical data that comprehensively
chart changes in organizational crime rates over time. . . . Con-
sequently, for this and other reasons, it is not possible to assess
directly the success, or lack thereof, of the organizational guide-
lines in altering the rates at which organizations commit crimes.270
In a recent book, criminologist Sally S. Simpson at once decried the
“woeful lack of research on corporate deterrence”271 and observed that the
little work done provides scant support for use of the criminal sanction.272
According to Simpson, “[p]unitiveness, as a strategy for corporate crime
control, is not well grounded in the empirical literature,”273 and in fact
criminal sanctions, rather than deterring corporate misconduct, perhaps
actually engender resistance to law.274 Simpson advocates a mix of inter-
ventions including compliance programs, in lieu of strict criminal pun-
                                                                                                                             
269
 J. Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics of White Collar Crime, 50 Hastings L.J.
1199, 1203 (1999); see also Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51
Emory L.J. 753 (2002) (noting and discussing the “new rule of lenity” embraced by con-
servative justices in their interpretation of “regulatory laws,” which the Guidelines punish
more harshly while providing less discretion to sentencing judges).
270
 John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior: The Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines Experiment Begins to Bear Fruit, in 1 Practicing Law Institute, Corporate
Compliance 113, 123 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B0-01A2,
2002). Vice Chairman Steer adds that “[e]ven if data showing changes in the absolute
number of organizational crimes over time were available, a multitude of potentially con-
founding variables would necessarily have to be disentangled.” Id. at 123 n.12. One such
factor is the empirical reality that the overwhelming majority of the 1089 cases in which
the Guidelines have been applied targeted small, closely held companies. Id. at 130–31. As
Steer notes:
These small businesses are less likely to have become aware of the sentencing
guidelines, or to have acted on any awareness they may have gained, by allocating
resources to develop a compliance program. Moreover, because such organiza-
tional offenders often, by their nature, involve high level management participa-
tion in the offense, they are precluded under the terms of guidelines from receiv-
ing sentencing credit for any compliance program that may have been developed.
Id. at 131.
271
 Sally S. Simpson, Corporate Crime, Law, and Social Control ix (2002).
272
 Id. at 159.
273
 Id. at 6.
274
 Id. at 45–60, 98.
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ishments alone,275 and emphasizes that “[i]t is important that crime con-
trol policies be inºuenced by science rather than political expediency.”276
Nevertheless, outrage over the recent corporate misdeeds associated
with Enron, WorldCom, ImClone, and Global Crossing has reawakened
the public to corporate wrongdoing. This time around the alleged wrong-
doing did not result in physical harms, but rather huge ªnancial losses
and consequent lost investor faith. The public mood, however, is decid-
edly averse to the traditional rationalization that such irregularities were
“merely business.”277 Rather, the public is demanding criminal liability,278
with its uniquely expressive moral stigma,279 despite the awkward ªt of
                                                                                                                             
275
 Id. at 155.
276
 Id. at 161; see also id. at 159 (citing the lack of supporting data for “‘pure’ crimi-
nalization” and asserting that “criminalization is uninformed by the empirical literature. It
is ‘bad science’ and therefore ‘bad policy.’”); id. at 153 (“Policy failures often stem from
implementation problems, bad science, and bad politics. . . . There is much suggestive
evidence that ‘strict’ criminalization ªts this characterization.”). For a similar expression of
this sentiment, see Gilbert Geis & Joseph F. C. Dimento, Empirical Evidence and the Legal
Doctrine of Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 Am. J. Crim. L. 341, 374 (2002):
The development of the doctrine of corporate criminal liability has been the result
almost exclusively of expediency rather than of empirical information. This is not
to say that what has resulted is necessarily wrong, only that it has not received the
social scientiªc attention that could resolve so many nagging, and very important
issues. Or, put another way, what now exists in law could prove to be wrong in
terms of what it seeks to achieve.
Id.; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 448 (1981)
(“[The] study of corporate criminal responsibility too long has been led astray by com-
mentators seeking to fashion retributive justiªcations and anthropomorphic analogies. Such
an approach . . . blinds us to the real issue of how to make deterrence work.”).
277
 See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Fear and Loathing in Corporate America, A.B.A. J., Jan.
2003, at 50 (citing a survey reporting high levels of distrust of corporations and anger at
corporate wrongdoing); Adam Nagourney, Corporate Abuses Cause Bipartisan Indigna-
tion, N.Y. Times, July 29, 2002, at A16 (noting widespread public anger over recent corpo-
rate abuses).
278
 This punitive orientation is reºected in the popularity of “perp walks” for corporate
executives who, shackled in handcuffs, are purposefully transported by police in the full
glare of the media. See Benjamin Weiser, Same Walk, Nicer Shoes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26,
2002, at B1 (describing recent public displays of arrested executives from Adelphia Com-
munications and WorldCom).
279
 See Lawrence Friedman, Essay, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 833, 854 (2000) (“Only criminal liability is understood against
the background of social norms, codiªed by the criminal law, as conveying the particular
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moral authority of the criminal law as a guide to rational behavior.”). For discussions of the
unique stigma thought to be associated with the criminal sanction, see Joel Feinberg,
Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 98–101 (1970); Im-
manuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice 138–41 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-
Merrill Co. 1965) (1797); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 401 (1958).
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the criminal law to the corporate form.280 Congress, with the 2002 elec-
tions looming, aggressively responded to the public outrage with high-
proªle hearings and proposals for dramatically heightened penalties and
more aggressive prosecution.281
D. The Evolving Governmental Aversion to Sanctuaries
As the preceding discussion suggests, the Church, family, and corpo-
ration have served as effective sanctuaries through the centuries, albeit
with distinct sustaining inºuences. Church sanctuary was sustained by
the potent institutional inºuence of the Church, backed by its pragmatic
role in mitigating the unrelentingly harsh justice otherwise meted out by
civil authorities. In more contemporary times, sanctuary has been re-
served for clergy, who beneªt from the Church’s same insularity and in-
timidating inºuence, today buttressed by the protective sheath of the First
Amendment. Family-based criminal immunity derived from enduring
patriarchal tendencies and was viewed as necessary to ensure the privacy
and autonomy central to stable domestic relations. Finally, for corpora-
tions, immunity endured as a result of the awkward ªt of the criminal
law—with its largely retributive, individualistic bent—to the corporate form,
as well as the prominent role played by corporations in American society.
Over time, however, the government became less willing to permit
the institutions to self-regulate and operate beyond the reach of the
criminal law. Once perceived as benign refuges, the institutions came to
be seen as havens that potentially cloak, and thus perpetuate, wrongdoing
and associated harms. Intervention into the Church, in particular, oc-
curred as a result of a complex mix of social and political factors that at
once weakened its intimidating inºuence and impelled the government to
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 See Alschuler, supra note 257, at 313:
It is too late to reconsider the error that the Supreme Court made in 1909; corpo-
rate criminal responsibility is here to stay. Nevertheless, we should recognize the
beast for what it is—not criminal punishment as we customarily understand pun-
ishment—but a form of instrumental regulation with which ordinary principles of
culpability do not ªt.
Id.; cf. Teitelbaum, supra note 163, at 1176 (stating that “[i]n relation to autonomy or pri-
vacy, the family is a ‘false concrete’ or anthropomorphism that we invoke to talk in terms
that do not literally apply . . . . Anthropomorphisms tend to be used when the body of ac-
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a System, supra note 181, at 542 (“[I]n ordinary discourse, we talk in terms that seem to
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 See, e.g., David Stout, For Candidates, Crimes Are Now Wearing White, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 5, 2002, at A19 (observing that the issue of crime in upcoming political campaigns
will likely “be personiªed by an executive in a thousand-dollar suit rather than a scowling
Willie Horton lookalike”). The hearings culminated in late July with passage of the Sar-
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Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and
It Might Just Work), 35 Conn. L. Rev. n.2 (forthcoming 2003).
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act. Emboldened victims of priest sexual abuse came forward and, for the
ªrst time, their allegations of abuse were heard and acted upon by gov-
ernment ofªcials. Reporters for the Boston Globe, a paper that took a
leading role in bringing the abuse to light, described the evolution in the
Boston Archdiocese in particular as follows:
The children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren of immi-
grants who would never dream of challenging anything a priest
did now demanded not just answers from their Church leaders
but accountability . . . Cardinal Law could rightly say that by hid-
ing the sexual abuse of priests from public view, he was doing
no more than what his predecessors did. But that no longer cut
him any slack with prosecutors and politicians, whose outrage at
the Church’s conduct was rising as their deference waned.282
By contrast, criminal accountability in the corporate and family
realms has been complicated by ambivalence over the behaviors they
have sheltered. For example, within the family, although child sexual
abuse was criminal (albeit infrequently detected or prosecuted), physical
beatings of wives and children were not; nor was sexual abuse of one’s
spouse. Likewise, despite the undisputed social harms associated with
corporate misbehavior, there has long been a spirited debate over whether
the harms should be cast as civil or criminal.283 The harms occurring
within families and corporations, however, drew governmental attention
and concern through a complex, extended process of social construction,
prompted by revelations of abuse.284 Ultimately, with respect to both, it
has taken the willingness of courts and legislatures to modify the sub-
stantive law to reºect changing public sentiments,285 and the willingness
of prosecutors to undertake the equally political job of holding corporate
and familial wrongdoers accountable.286
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 See generally Theodore R. Sarbin & John I. Kitsuse, Constructing the So-
cial (1987); Malcolm Spector & John I. Kitsuse, Constructing Social Problems
(2001).
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 See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96
Mich. L. Rev. 1269, 1294 (1998) (“Criminal law choices are controvertible, fundamentally
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was fueled by something more than the mere numerical increase in corporations over time
and the attendant harms they caused. European countries, in which corporations also pre-
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Beyond these distinctions, however, there is no mistaking the similar
forces accompanying the increased governmental willingness to use the
criminal law to address wrongdoing in the formerly self-regulating do-
mains. To a considerable degree, this evolution with respect to family and
Church, in particular, conªrms the astute observation Donald Black made
over a quarter century ago, that “[l]aw is stronger where other social
control is weaker”; that “[l]aw varies inversely with other social con-
trol.”287 In other words, as the institutions have loosened their authorita-
tive grip over constituents, allowing the revelation of wrongdoing, the
government has correspondingly become more willing to intervene.288
Similarly, although corporate entities have become no less authoritarian
over time, the public perceives them to be less law-abiding and ethical.289
This public perception in turn has prompted governmental intervention.290
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corporate liability for involuntary manslaughter (“corporate killing”), prompted by a series
of fatal train and ferry catastrophes, see P. R. Glazebrook, A Better Way of Convicting
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corporation).
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 See Michael Orey & Milo Geyelin, Lawyers Find Jury Pools Polluted by Antibusi-
ness Biases, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at B1 (noting same). The sentiment was reºected
in a speech delivered by President Bush before a Wall Street audience in the wake of the
recent corporate scandals:
At this moment, America’s greatest economic need is higher ethical standards
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President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Corporate Responsibility (July 9,
2002), available at 2002 WL 1461845.
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 This extension of criminal law into previously self-regulated realms has been par-
alleled by extensions of civil law, often facilitated by legislative and judicial efforts to
dismantle immunities traditionally enjoyed by governments, spouses, parents, charities,
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Social movements have also played a critical role in reducing gov-
ernmental deference to the respective institutions. The women’s and child
welfare movements succeeded in pulling back the curtain on family life,
revealing the sinister consequences of state protection of privacy and
autonomy in that domain. Similarly, Americans became more apt to press
for corporate liability, in part, because of Progressive Era sensitization to
corporate misdeeds; diminished deference to institutions after Watergate
and the Vietnam War;291 and the consumer movement’s drive for corpo-
rate accountability.292 For the Church, ºagging governmental deference to
its institutional authority, along with public outrage over child abuse,293 at
last triggered criminal law intervention.294 Finally, with respect to each,
an emboldened victims’ rights movement—a newcomer to the social move-
ments scene—played a key role in pressuring government to intervene.295
A less obvious but no less important inºuence has been the recurrent
governmental need to expand the reach of its criminal law. While it might
be true, as Montesquieu observed, that decreases in the severity of the
penal law accompany advances in governmental accessions to liberty,296 it
is also true that government is typically intolerant of self-regulating do-
mains beyond its reach. The eventual governmental crackdowns on
Church sanctuary and beneªt of clergy qualify as obvious examples of this
tendency. More recently, one can point to the U.S. government’s ongoing
efforts, starting in the late nineteenth century, to eradicate bigamy and
polygamy in the West.297 Less well-known, in the late nineteenth and
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Leader is Survived by 33 Sons and a Void, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 2002, at A22; Adam Lip-
tak, Polygamist’s Custody Fight Raises Many Issues, N.Y. Times, June 16, 2002, at A14.
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early twentieth centuries several U.S. cities, including St. Louis, New
Orleans, Houston, and St. Paul, condoned prostitution, despite its express
criminalization by state authorities.298 These “anomalous zones,” too, were
eventually stamped out due to their “subversive potential.”299
More recent evidence of this governmental impulse is found in the
U.S. government’s imposition of harsh criminal justice initiatives on state
and local governments. These include efforts to countermand state and
local laws permitting the medical use of marijuana;300 the dramatic ex-
pansion of federal statutory criminal law in areas historically the terrain
of state governments;301 and laws to compel states to abide by more ex-
acting federal criminal justice mandates under threat of forfeiting grant
money.302 The states, as well, are loath to allow localities to deviate from
their criminal law script.303 Finally, at the international level, multilateral
treaties are now being drafted304 to ªll the legal lacuna that has long im-
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munized multinational corporations from criminal prosecutions for a
broad range of abuses.305
At the same time, however, sanctuaries persist,306 and to the minds of
some serve a positive purpose. Herman Bianchi, for instance, argues that
sanctuary can serve as a “new system of crime control,”307 and points to
several secular examples. For instance, “free towns” existed in the Neth-
erlands between 1580 and 1795 for debtors and slayers,308 and thousands
enjoyed sanctuary in one Denmark town until 1827.309 As Bianchi notes,
the “idea and institution of sanctuary were not in agreement with the new
legal ideas of a state monopoly of crime control” and “new ideas on crimi-
nal legislation.”310 Bianchi also notes that the procedural law to this day
at times prohibits arrest by police during worship services.311 “In princi-
ple,” he notes, “a congregation that starts a religious service but never
concludes it would by such an act create a legal place of sanctuary.”312
Bianchi urges greater use of sanctuaries, established and regulated by
statutory law, and operated in the open with knowledge of civil authori-
ties.313 Drawing on the diplomatic immunity afforded modern embassies,
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Bianchi suggests that law enforcement should closely monitor the com-
ings and goings of those inside the sanctuary.314 Sanctuary would harbor
only violent wrongdoers, who would at once be held accountable for their
wrongs and be required to seek negotiated settlements with their victims,
consistent with his “eunomic,” non-punitive model of social control predi-
cated on conºict resolution.315 While the existing criminal prosecution
apparatus would remain an alternative, victim and victimizer would have:
[An] inalienable right to demand that their conºict be resolved
by negotiation instead of punishment. The state prosecution
would no longer have the monopoly of crime control if a better
solution can be found . . . . If the two parties in a crime conºict
have established a reasonable and fair agreement on the resolu-
tion of their conºict, the public prosecution renounces its right
of further indictment . . . . If after prolonged negotiations the
parties still fail to agree, the sanctuary will have to decide the
case. The fugitive may be required either to stay much longer in
the sanctuary and perhaps work at a useful job inside or to enter
into negotiations with the district attorney.316
In short, Bianchi argues that sanctuary, although ancient, is not only fa-
miliar to modern legal systems, but has a proper role to play in contem-
porary society.317
Bianchi’s advocacy of sanctuary, however, runs decidedly against the
tide of history, as governments have increasingly extended the reach of
criminal law accountability. As one commentator has observed with re-
spect to familial abuse, “private violence is [now] a matter of public obli-
gation,”318 not a matter left to self-governance. Likewise, the increased
willingness to hold corporations criminally accountable has been said to
“reºect . . . the maturity of the state and the autonomy of the legal or-
der.”319 The sexual abuse of children by clergy, as well, has now met with
public outrage and calls for aggressive state intervention, including prose-
cution of the Church and its ofªcials. The next Part addresses the tangi-
ble outcomes of the governmental willingness to invoke the criminal law
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 Cullen et al., supra note 186, at 134–35.
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in the realms of family and corporation, and attempts to draw some les-
sons for its possible application to the effort to combat sexual abuse
within the Church.
III. The Limits of the Law
While most observers believe the extension of the criminal law to
families and corporations to be a triumph of ªn-de-siècle progress, it
nonetheless remains a truism that its use does not necessarily translate
into social solutions or relief for victims.320 This Part examines the sev-
eral decades-long efforts to detect, deter, and punish harms committed
within families and corporations, and offers some thoughts on how the
law might best be brought to bear on criminal sexual abuse within the
Church.321
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A. The Family
Despite the now universal recognition of its applicability, the crimi-
nal law is regarded as having only modest transformative force on abuse
in the domestic realm. Physical and sexual abuse within families remains
alarmingly common. Annually, an estimated 4.8 million women suffer
intimate partner physical or sexual abuse, and approximately 2.9 million
men suffer physical assaults at the hands of intimates.322 According to the
U.S. Surgeon General, battering by an intimate is the nation’s single
greatest cause of injury to women.323 In 1999, 542 women were killed by
their husbands, and 432 were killed by their boyfriends.324 The incidence
of reported child abuse, while declining in recent years, remains shock-
ingly high. In 1998, an estimated 103,600 children endured sexual abuse,325
and more than one million experienced maltreatment.326 Each day in the
United States an estimated three children die as a result of abuse.327 Spousal
and child abuse, moreover, often occur in tandem: children of battered
women are ªfteen times more likely to be abused than children of women
who were not abused.328 Available data also suggest that battered mothers
are more likely than other mothers to abuse their children.329
As troubling as they are, the numbers likely signiªcantly understate
the incidence of abuse, given the common reluctance of victims to con-
tact police.330 Research also underscores that, beyond causing tangible
physical harms, abuse has negative effects on family function331 and often
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Texas, 7 Tex. J. Women & L. 287, 288 (1998); see also Jeffrey L. Edelson, The Overlap
Between Child Maltreatment and Woman Battering, 5 Violence Against Women 134
(1999).
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 Daigle, supra note 328, at 293.
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 See generally Am. Psychological Ass’n, Violence and the Family: Report of the
American Psychological Association Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family,
Executive Summary, available at http://www.apa.org/pi/pii/viol&fam.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2003).
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has intergenerational effects on children, contributing to a “cycle of vio-
lence” that puts them at greater risk of becoming abusers later in life.332
The justice system has responded by adopting increasingly aggres-
sive and controversial strategies in recent years. Foremost among these
are mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution, each designed to remedy
the historically weak response of the criminal justice system to spousal
abuse.333 Mandatory arrest policies emerged in the mid-1980s in response
to the chronic failure of police to arrest abusers.334 The policies require
that police arrest offenders when there is probable cause to suspect com-
mission of a domestic assault or battery, regardless of the wishes of the
victim or ofªcer.335 Most U.S. jurisdictions now have some form of man-
datory arrest policy in effect,336 complemented by increased statutory
authority of police to execute warrantless arrests.337 No-drop prosecution
policies, which emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, require that
prosecutors proceed with a domestic violence charge, regardless of their
wishes or those of the victim.338 Today, sixty-six percent of prosecutors’
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California, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 643 (1997). For discussion of mandatory reporting laws (initi-
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Berk, The Speciªc Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 Am. Soc. Rev. 261
(1984). For a comprehensive overview of mandatory arrest, see Lawrence W. Sherman
et al., Policing Domestic Violence: Experiments and Dilemmas (1992).
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has required eligible state grantees to certify that their laws or policies “encourage or man-
date arrests of domestic violence offenders based on probable cause that an offense has
been committed.” 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1)(A) (2000).
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 See Zorza, supra note 169, at 61–63.
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Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1996). Professor Hanna
identiªes two varieties of no-drop policies: “soft” and “hard.” Id. at 1863. The former en-
courages victim cooperation in prosecution but does not require that victims be subpoe-
naed or charged with contempt for failure to appear. At the victim’s request, charges may
be dropped if the victim agrees to see a counselor or informs the court of the reasons she
wants charges dropped. With hard-drop policies, victims may be subpoenaed to testify,
with contempt looming if they fail to appear, and charges cannot be dropped under any
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ofªces in major urban areas have adopted no-drop policies.339 Together,
the approaches seek to limit the discretionary authority historically wielded
by police and prosecutors to minimize or ignore incidents of domestic
violence, in effect forcing justice system actors to instantiate substantive
legal reforms eradicating immunity.340 They also send the uncompromis-
ing signal, to potential abusers and the public at large, that domestic
abuse is unacceptable and warrants criminal prosecution.341
The mandatory policies represent hard-won political gains for advo-
cates and attest to the seriousness with which domestic abuse is now
taken by the government. At long last, advocates stressed, state actors,
although compelled to do so, would treat domestic assaults and batteries
in the same manner as other crimes.342 The policies beneªted from strong
political cachet; although a “women’s issue,” they combined the appeal
of the “tough on crime” sensibility with a precept that liberals and con-
servatives alike could subscribe to: “Beating women is wrong.”343
                                                                                                                             
circumstances. According to Hanna, “[b]atterers will be less likely to intimidate women
throughout the process . . . if they know that the state is serious about pursuing its domes-
tic violence cases.” Id. at 1892.
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 See Donald J. Rebovich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence: Results of a
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lence be treated as a criminal act rather than a private matter . . . . The ªling, nonªling, or
diversion of criminal charges [will] be determined by . . . specialized prosecutors over the
objection of the victim, if necessary.”).
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 In several jurisdictions, the reforms have been backed by mandatory sentencing
provisions for domestic abuse convictions. See Hanna, supra note 336, at 1578 n.302.
Moreover, states are increasingly authorizing or mandating signiªcantly enhanced criminal
penalties for domestic violence committed in the presence of children. See Weithorn, supra
note 154, at 16–17.
341
 For more on this expressivist function of more aggressive criminal interventions in
the domestic sphere, see Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domes-
tic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 Fordham L. Rev.
853, 874 (1994); Hanna, supra note 338, at 1889–1900; Lisa G. Lerman, The Decontextu-
alization of Domestic Violence, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 217, 224–25 (1992); Mar-
ion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But is it
Enough?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 533, 554. As with mandatory arrest, the federal government
has sought to encourage state action, authorizing distribution of funds to states that adopt
“aggressive and vertical prosecution policies” as part of the Violence Against Women Act.
See 42 U.S.C. § 10410(a)(2)(E) (2000).
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 However, as Professor Elizabeth Schneider has noted, feminists were initially wary
of state criminal law intervention, and in lieu thereof concentrated on developing safe
houses, shelters and alternate institutions. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered
Women and Feminist Lawmaking 182 (2000). This stance changed over time, however,
as the criminal law and its aggressive enforcement became a prime weapon in the cam-
paign against domestic violence. See id. at 182–88 (discussing the emergence of no-drop
prosecution and mandatory arrest policies and their rationales and motivations).
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 Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing
Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Relation-
ships, 15 Hamline L. Rev. 115, 124 (1991); see also Hanna, supra note 336, at 1514 (ob-
serving that “the criminalization of domestic violence has made for some strange bedfel-
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Social science research, however, suggests that the results of the
mandatory approaches are mixed. Studies regarding mandatory arrest
indicate that it provides uncertain speciªc deterrence, often depending on
the offenders’ background, and may even increase the likelihood of future
violence.344 Studies also fail to demonstrate a clear general deterrent ef-
fect.345 Finally, mandatory arrest—which can include a “dual arrest” pol-
icy346—increases the collateral risk that women will be unduly arrested,
harming their ability to secure child custody.347 The results of no-drop
prosecution are similarly ambiguous, with research yielding uncertainty
as to whether the approach exercises a general or speciªc deterrent inºuence
on domestic abuse.348
The data have prompted some advocates to seriously rethink man-
datory policies. Professor Linda Mills, for instance, has criticized the
approaches, drawing attention to the “violence of state intervention.”349
She asserts that mandatory arrest and prosecution “can themselves be
forms of abuse. . . . [I]ronically, the very state interventions designed to
eradicate the intimate abuse . . . all too often reproduce the emotional
abuse of the battering relationship.”350 Mandatory policies thus render
battered women “less, rather than more, safe from violence,” and can
serve to disrupt family stability and economic security.351 Ultimately, Mills
cautions, mandatory policies risk threatening or disregarding “a battered
woman’s interests for a larger political cause. Whether a misogynist po-
lice ofªcer or a feminist prosecutor implements the policy is irrele-
vant.”352 By mandating criminal processes in which the victim might not
                                                                                                                             
344
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 Id. at 554.
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be willing or prepared to participate, the policies may encourage women
to identify with their abusers and lead them to regard the government as
the antagonist.353 Similarly, echoing a concern that dates back to the ªrst
efforts to hold abusers criminally accountable,354 commentators have ex-
pressed concern that aggressive intervention disproportionately disad-
vantages racial minorities, immigrants, and persons of lower socio-
economic status.355 The harsh consequences triggered by a call to the po-
lice, in short, not only might inadvertently disserve the interests of abuse
victims, but also might discourage them from coming forward, perpetu-
ating the underreporting of abuse and driving it further into the hidden
recesses of the family.356
More controversially, Professor Deborah Epstein, building upon the
work of social psychologist Tom Tyler,357 criticizes mandatory policies
for their lack of perceived “procedural justice” for abusers.358 Because the
discretionless policies seek to eliminate the capacity of justice system
actors to consider individual circumstances, they “reduce[ ] the likeli-
hood that defendants will voice their version of events, perceive they are
being treated with respect, and feel that state authorities are attempting to
                                                                                                                             
necessary to protect women overall.”).
353
 Mills, supra note 349, at 595.
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1241, 1257 (1991); Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence
Against Women in the Paciªc-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 Stan. L.
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be fair.”359 As a consequence, abusers’ compliance with legal directives
can be undermined, increasing the prospects for battering.360
In sum, mandatory policies can be said to achieve at least two posi-
tive goals. First, by removing discretion from the daily work of justice
system actors, they help ensure responsiveness on the part of government.
Second, they embody and promote the valuable expressive goal that do-
mestic violence be taken seriously and treated as the crime it is. How-
ever, the debate continues over whether the criminal law is the end-all,361
calling into question whether harsh, discretionless approaches are the
best strategy in the campaign against domestic abuse.362
B. The Corporation
Similarly, the aggressive use of criminal law has proved controver-
sial in the corporate realm. To a considerable extent this can be attributed
to the sustained political battle waged since the early 1900s against cor-
porate criminal accountability in general. However, the shift is also tes-
tament to the unique challenges presented by corporations, which lack an
identiªable soul to morally condemn or physical body to punish. At the
same time, corporations are susceptible to a complex array of conºicting
organizational incentives and moral hazards that strain the capacity of the
criminal law to deter misconduct.363 Thus, the theoretical foundations gird-
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ing governmental intervention rely more on law and economics and or-
ganizational theory than on criminology and penology.364
As a result, in contrast to the control of crime in the streets, with its
dominant emphasis on retribution, crime in the suites is now thought best
addressed by a highly nuanced system of social control. As one com-
mentator put it, there has been a shift toward “a regulatory mix of pun-
ishment and persuasion.”365 The approach is most pronounced in the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations, which, as discussed above, em-
ploy a “carrot and stick” approach.366 According to the Chair of the Sen-
tencing Commission:
Punishment is thus not the ultimate purpose of the organiza-
tional guidelines. If imposition of a ªne would preclude an or-
ganization from making restitution or otherwise remedying the
harm it caused, the ªne is to be waived. Rather, their ultimate
purpose is the promotion of good corporate citizenship through
encouraging implementation of effective compliance programs,
which—it is hoped—will prevent crime.367
This emphasis on deterrence and compliance, in turn, has led to the crea-
tion of an entirely new corporate vocation—the Ethics and Compliance
Ofªcer—and given rise to an “elaborate cottage industry of ethics com-
pliance and preventive law experts.”368 In effect, ªrms are expected to self-
police,369 and they are rewarded for both pre- and post-offense efforts to
comply with the law.370 Available data suggest that such incentives have
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Comm’n ed., 1995).
367
 Murphy, supra note 249, at 706; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
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 See Jay P. Kesan, Encouraging Firms to Police Themselves: Strategic Prescriptions
to Promote Corporate Self-Auditing, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 155.
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positive effect, with signiªcant numbers of corporate ethics ofªcers re-
porting that the Guidelines prompted initiation of or improvement in
compliance efforts.371
Over time the governmental approach has thus increasingly assumed
an unmistakable civil-regulatory mien. Criminal liability, as Professor
V. S. Khanna has observed, entails “stronger procedural protections;
more powerful enforcement devices; [and] more severe and, arguably,
unique sanctions. . . .”372 However, according to Khanna, “[m]ost, if not
all, of the advantages of corporate criminal liability can be achieved by
various forms of corporate civil liability at lower cost to the government
and society.”373 Among the purported costs of corporate criminal liability
is the marked tendency of corporations, when faced with harsh criminal
sanctions, to impede or prevent the ºow of relevant information to public
ofªcials; such information is imperative to fact-ªnding and, in many in-
stances, to the healing process of victims.374 As noted by Professor Wil-
liam Laufer:
To free the hand of regulators and prosecutors and minimize the
costs of compliance, reciprocity and negotiated forbearance are
now preferred strategies. Substantial assistance departures and
mitigation credits, as well as voluntary disclosure, leniency, and
amnesty programs, dot the enforcement and regulatory land-
scape.375
In lieu of strict application of the criminal law, “cases of corporate crime
are adjudicated by a brand of negotiated compliance. Corporate coopera-
tion that facilitates the ºow of evidence to authorities is the critical fea-
ture of this regulatory strategy.”376 Corporate cooperation, importantly,
depends on “regulatory discretion . . . where ªrms earn reputations for
being good and thus deserving of reasonable, more discretionary enforce-
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ment. Bad ªrms, those which are uncooperative, are ‘subjected to harsher
and more legalistic enforcement appropriate for hardened criminals.’”377
In short, in the name of achieving optimal compliance, corporate crimi-
nal misconduct is now predominantly self-regulated and priced,378 rather
than policed and punished.379 This reliance on self-regulation has emerged
despite both the acknowledged reality that corporate crime imposes a far
greater toll on American society than street crime,380 and the desert-based
expressive desire to impose retribution that has permeated corporate
criminal liability from its origin.381 To its advocates, the self-regulatory
approach does more than simply avoid the age-old deontological barrier
against imputing blame to, and imposing punishment upon, a mere juris-
tic entity. It actually best serves the consequentialist goal of reducing the
economic and social carnage of corporate wrongdoing.382 According to
Professor Khanna, if we choose a retributive approach, we must recog-
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nize “what we are giving up to opt for a ‘morally’ sound criminal justice
system—more crime. If we think the trade off is worth it then we may go
ahead and make it, but that should (indeed must) be an informed
choice.”383 Ultimately, however, Khanna contends that “the large costs of
corporate wrongdoing should counsel society to eschew reliance on des-
ert-based theories if they are likely to lead to an increase in corporate
wrongdoing.”384
While the civil-regulatory approach is surely not free of contro-
versy,385 criminal law scholars have of late considered its potential appli-
cation in non-corporate contexts. In a provocative recent article, Profes-
sor Darryl Brown invoked the approach to argue against reºexive resort
to the customary retributive, desert-based approach to dealing with street
crime.386 According to Brown, the “[c]riminal law’s expressive and re-
tributive functions sometimes conºict because punitive approaches alien-
ate offenders, reduce cooperation toward compliance, and may damage
the legitimacy of law that is important for deterrence. Even when morally
justiªed, retributivist sanctions can harm prevention efforts and reduce
voluntary compliance.”387 Brown condemns what he calls the “unproduc-
tive retributivism in street crime law” and urges adoption of a mix of
civil remedies, regulatory strategies, and criminal sanctions, similar to
those found in the white-collar context.388 In short, instead of embracing
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 Khanna, supra note 373, at 1283 n.270.
384
 Id. at 1282–83.
385
 See, e.g., Friedrichs, supra note 378, at 341 (“[T]he criminal law in particular,
must continue to be one central feature to the response to white collar crime. It is the only
mechanism of social control that can adequately express appropriate moral outrage . . . .”);
Laureen Snider, Regulating Corporate Behavior, in Corporate Crime: Contemporary
Debates 199, 199–203 (Frank Pearce et al. eds., 1995) (surveying the limits of the coop-
erative regulatory approach); James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Cor-
porate Misconduct, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 3–8 (1997) (questioning whether cor-
porate misconduct can be deterred by ªnes and adequately priced); Laufer, supra note 370,
at 667 (“In the end, the expressive nature of the criminal law is the best hope to control the
immense power of corporations.”).
386
 See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of
Criminal Liability, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1295 (2001).
387
 Id. at 1297; see also id. at 1304 (discussing instances of failed aggressive criminal
intervention against corporate wrongdoing and asserting that “punitive enforcement en-
gendered resistance from target groups and their communities, creating a reduced incentive
to cooperate with regulators to sustain compliance”).
388
 Id. at 1298. Brown urges that street crime doctrine borrow the heightened emphasis
of corporate criminal law on social context:
[T]he doctrine of corporate liability is a unique acknowledgement of the relevance
of social norms and inºuence on individuals’ criminal conduct. It implies that, to
prevent crime, we need to direct liability not only at the individual actor, but at
the social context in which she acts—the social context that shares responsibility
for her criminal conduct. Once a crime is committed, the expression of social dis-
approval is justly directed at those contributing to the social context as well as the
individual . . . .
Our most troubled and stressed communities, particularly in inner cities, are
surely as criminogenic as the worst ªrms that incur corporate liability. Yet, we do
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“the long-standing argument that corporate crime’s tremendous harms
require treating it more seriously, we should instead treat street crime
more like white-collar crime.”389 According to Brown:
[S]treet crime enforcement could take strides toward preventive,
compliance-oriented, less punitive, regulatory strategies that we
have devised for white-collar wrongdoing. It could take advan-
tage of, rather than ignore and contradict, knowledge about so-
cial inºuence; it could more fully assess and minimize the so-
cial costs of punishment. Street crime policy could follow cor-
porate regulatory policy by making criminal law an ancillary
tool for prevention. This would be one means among several for
confronting the most culpable wrongdoing, while a mix of less
punitive strategies dominates policy.390
                                                                                                                             
not give the same weight to social inºuence on street offenders as corporate
criminal offenders.
Id. at 1319. While such street conditions themselves of course do not warrant liability, as
in the analogous corporate realm, Brown urges that their negative inºuence be taken into
account in assessing the culpability of street crime offenders, much as compliance efforts
can now serve to mitigate corporate culpability. Id. at 1320–23. Brown asserts that:
By positioning white-collar crime within a special space of criminal law that ac-
cepts social inºuence premises, corporate liability supports ideas about both the
nature of offenders and of the crime that move white-collar practice away from
the most punitive forms of criminal justice practice and toward a more civil,
regulatory model of addressing wrongdoing and social harms.
Id. at 1323.
389
 Id at 1298; see also id. at 1360 (“Within its universe of regulatory tools and sanc-
tions, corporate regulation is relatively stingy with criminal judgments. For distributive
equity and more effective policy, we should also look to that model for regulation of street
crime.”).
Professor Joseph Kennedy recently made a similar argument in the context of mens
rea provisions of federal criminal law, which the Supreme Court has most often read quite
narrowly when the defendant faces imprisonment (not probation) under the Sentencing
Guidelines. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 Emory L.J.
753 (2002). Endorsing the “new lenity” manifested, Kennedy concludes:
Ultimately, those who advocate less severity for the poor and those of color will
not be well-served by advocating for more severity for the middle class and white.
Severity breeds severity. Let leniency take root where the soil is (unfortunately)
more fertile and with any luck it may creep back into places where it is harder to
grow but w[h]ere it is needed all the more.
Id. at 875 n.501; cf. John Braithwaite, Inequality and Republican Criminology, in Crime
and Inequality 277, 280 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995) (arguing that des-
ert-based doctrine ultimately imposes harsher penalties on rich and poor alike and that an
approach that makes punishment “as low as we can [make] it without clear emerging evi-
dence that crime has increased as a result” turns out to be more equitable).
390
 Brown, supra note 386, at 1345. By way of illustration, Brown notes how several
current criminal justice initiatives—community policing, drug treatment courts, and thera-
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While noteworthy for its originality, Brown’s perspective bears added
signiªcance for its convergence with other current scholarship critical of
aggressive use of the criminal sanction, such as in the domestic realm. In
an intriguing turn of events, shifting pragmatic and philosophical inter-
ests have converged to cast doubt on the preeminence of the criminal law
in the corporate and domestic spheres,391 much as is now occurring with
respect to illicit drugs392 and even trade secrets.393 Perhaps more intrigu-
ing, as Professor Brown’s work suggests, the softening of corporate criminal
liability is being harnessed in an attempt to reverse, or at least mitigate,
the current draconian punitive response to street crime. In the next Sec-
tion, we discuss how these views might be applied within the context of
the Church.
C. Lessons To Be Learned
As suggested above, despite hard-won legal and ideological victories
hastening application of the criminal law in the corporate and domestic
contexts, disagreement exists over whether the law’s traditional desert-
based orientation is best suited to address wrongs occurring therein. This
controversy largely stems from the perceived negative collateral conse-
quences associated with the aggressive use of the criminal law, notwith-
standing its acknowledged expressive beneªts. While harsh policies
might “feel good,” they do not necessarily reduce crime or alleviate its
associated harms.
As society grapples with clergy sexual abuse, the lessons learned in
the campaigns against corporate and domestic wrongdoing warrant con-
sideration, especially given the similarities among the three contexts. All
                                                                                                                             
peutic/restorative justice—already reºect such an orientation. See id. at 1346–58; see also
Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 Cal. L. Rev.
1513, 1526 (2002) (“[I]t is when the state penalizes criminal wrongdoing severely that
individuals are most likely to be inhibited from cooperating out of guilt or fear of being
branded a collaborator.”).
391
 Symptomatic of this shift is Brown’s comment that “[Edwin] Sutherland urged that
we respond to white-collar wrongdoing with more criminal law. That idea may have had
some merit half a century ago.” Brown, supra note 386, at 1359.
392
 See Gregory H. Williams & Sara C. Williams, America’s Drug Policy: Who Are the
Addicts?, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1119, 1130 (1990).
Similar arguments are now being made with respect to application of the exclusionary
rule for Fourth Amendment violations, which carries many negative collateral conse-
quences such as encouraging police “testilying.” For reevaluations of how such negative
consequences might be ameliorated by application of less punitive approaches, see Sharon
L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion—A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1275 (2000);
Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exlusionary Rule, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1
(2001); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 363.
393
 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating
Use of Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 853 (2002).
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share an institutional predisposition to secrecy and resistance to outside
scrutiny, which the threatened use of the criminal law might only fuel.
Churches, like corporations and families, are reºexively disinclined to
draw public attention to their moral failings394 and exercise powerful in-
stitutional inºuences against disclosure.395 The Church’s use of sealed
private settlements,396 its hiding or destruction of legally damaging docu-
ments,397 and its scorched earth litigation tactics,398 are obstructionist
techniques common to the reaction of corporate entities in particular, and
provide compelling testament to the Church’s secretive predilections.399
Given these similarities, implementation of aggressive policies within
the institution might prove counterproductive, similar to harsh ap-
proaches applied in the domestic and corporate realms. In lieu thereof,
more proactive, structural changes deserve consideration. For instance,
insofar as sexual abuse is rightfully thought of as an “occupational crime”
based on the clergy’s access to children,400 the Church should adopt a rule
preventing unaccompanied clergy from being in the presence of mi-
                                                                                                                             
394
 Speaking to the parallel between Church and family in particular, journalist Jason
Berry has invoked the analogy of “church-as-dysfunctional family,” and noted that “Ca-
tholicism is steeped in familial imagery—Holy Mother the Church, priests as fathers of a
parish. Harboring child molesters is akin to the dynamics of an incestuous family.” Berry,
supra note 77, at 277.
395
 See supra notes 82–90 and accompanying text; see also Alan Cooperman & Lena
H. Sun, Hundreds of Priests Removed Since ’60s, Wash. Post, June 9, 2002, at A1 (noting
that nearly one half of dioceses surveyed refused to provide information on the extent of
abuse allegations made in their dioceses); Anthony DePalma, Bishop Looking into Claims
Priests Protected Abuser, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 2002, at B5 (noting how two priests in the
Bridgeport, Connecticut, diocese for nine years kept secret their knowledge of the where-
abouts of a fellow priest accused of sexual abuse of minors, and that the diocese knew of
such abuse since 1964).
396
 See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
397
 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
398
 See Pam Belluck, Diocese is Said to Depose Abuse Therapists, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
2003, at A18 (noting that lawyers for the Boston Archdiocese have targeted victims’ thera-
pists for depositions and have subpoenaed records of therapy sessions); Belluck, supra
note 98 (noting that Church lawyers are “conducting aggressive litigation” in defense of
abuse civil suits); Robert D. McFadden, supra note 78 (describing a diocese “intervention
team” dedicated to neutralizing revelations of abuse and extracting low monetary settle-
ments); Michael Powell & Lois Romano, Roman Catholic Church Shifts Legal Strategy,
Wash. Post, May 13, 2002, at A1 (noting that, while once the Church “tried to quietly
settle cases,” it is now “pursuing an aggressive litigation strategy” including use of private
detectives, harsh deposition tactics, efforts to keep documents secret based on canon law,
invocation of First Amendment arguments to preclude litigation, and tactics to minimize
settlements).
399
 As Max Weber pointed out, the organizational rubric of the Catholic Church in par-
ticular has served historically as a model for bureaucratic organizations. See Max Weber,
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Studienausgabe, cited in Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, The Church
as a Religious Organization, in The Church as Institution 70, 75 (Gregory Baum &
Andrew Greeley eds., 1974).
400
 Cf. Friedrichs, supra note 378, at 113 (noting that “[m]inisters, priests, rabbis, and
other religious leaders or clergy may commit crimes such as sexual molestation of children
partly because of the special opportunities provided by their occupation”).
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nors.401 Moreover, newly created local review boards, which now serve
merely an advisory function in evaluating claims of abuse, could play a
more signiªcant role in the actual adjudication of allegations; this could
replace the closed-door, cleric-run procedure recently adopted by U.S.
Catholic bishops.402 Also, in the interest of greater transparency, an inde-
pendent party or entity might appoint local diocesan board members, in-
stead of permitting bishops to make such appointments.403 If local boards,
rather than the National Review Board created by the Conference of Bish-
ops, were to exercise plenary authority over whether bishops who ignore
or abet crimes should be sanctioned,404 the prospect for structural change
will be even more signiªcant.
More generally, reform should be guided by the recognition that
abuse may best be deterred by a mix of formal (legal) and informal
(norms) inºuences. Research regarding domestic abuse in particular sug-
gests that optimal deterrence of violence turns on the reciprocal inºuence
of formal and informal costs, including prison and jail time, and intangi-
ble adverse consequences like loss of community standing.405 Social
norms are also thought to promote positive corporate self-governance.
Two prominent advocates of this view are Professors Edward Rock and
Michael Wachter, who have noted the interdependent role of laws and
norms.406 Rock and Wachter characterize corporate norms as “non-legally
enforceable rules or standards” (NLERS).407 NLERS, they contend, origi-
nate both from management and workers and exist throughout the or-
ganization. The job of management is to cultivate positive norms, while
seeking to extirpate and counteract their negative counterparts.
Borrowing from this literature, efforts should be dedicated to height-
ening the internal social costs that clergy suffer for committing sexual
abuse, superiors suffer for failing to prevent it, and the institution suffers
                                                                                                                             
401
 It would appear that such a policy and practice would be well within the discretion-
ary authority of the Church’s new Ofªce of Child and Youth Protection, inaugurated by the
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops at the June 2002 meeting in Dallas as part of its
“Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People.” See U.S. Conference of Catho-
lic Bishops, supra note 114.
402
 See supra notes 108–116 and accompanying text.
403
 See Pam Louwagie et al., Abbey Promises Change, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St.
Paul), Oct. 2, 2002, at 1A, 2002 WL 5383548 (describing non-monetary settlement obliga-
tions agreed to by Minnesota abbey, including equal role of laity in naming members of
local review board).
404
 See Jane Lampman, Catholic Reform Panel: Does It Have Teeth?, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Aug. 1, 2002, at 3.
405
 See Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Controlling Male Aggression in Intimate
Relationships, 23 Law & Soc’y Rev. 591 (1989); Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins,
The Meaning of Arrest for Wife Assault, 27 Criminology 163 (1989).
406
 See, e.g., Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1619 (2001) [hereinafter
Rock & Wachter, Islands]; Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Law as a
Facilitator of Self Governance, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 529 (2000).
407
 See Rock & Wachter, Islands, supra note 406, at 1623.
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for tolerating and perhaps condoning it.408 Church ofªcials, acting as
“norm entrepreneurs,”409 must take it upon themselves to foster a positive,
communal sense of the moral imperative for clergy to refrain from abuse,
and should be mindful of the broader institutional beneªts to the Church
resulting from its demonstrated capacity to ensure that its personnel op-
erate within the conªnes of the law.
The reaction of Church ofªcials to allegations of abuse attests to this
need for cultural transformation.410 Many ofªcials regarded abuse allega-
tions as unworthy of attention because they did not involve “true pedo-
philia,” but rather “ephebophilia” (attraction to adolescent males, not pre-
teens), thought to be less opprobious.411 Aside from being empirically
incorrect,412 such a sentiment suggests the existence of a perverse institu-
tional misapprehension, or perhaps rationalization, that is at odds with
reality and the criminal law. In order to combat the unhealthy culture
giving rise to the sexual violations, Church leaders should make clear
statements to rank-and-ªle clergy that such sexual contact with minors,
whatever their age, is criminal and unacceptable. Likewise, Church ofªcials
would exercise a positive transformative inºuence if they unconditionally
rejected the recurring expressed sentiment that somehow the young vic-
tims or their parents were responsible for the sexual abuse.413
Finally, similar to corporate regulatory mechanisms, a carrot and
stick approach might be employed to detect and deter wrongdoing within
the reºexively closed institution.414 Given the catastrophic toll on the Church
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 Describing the NASA institutional culture leading up to the Challenger disaster, so-
ciologist Diane Vaughn referred to this phenomenon as the “normalization of technical
deviation.” Diane Vaughn, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology,
Culture, and Deviance at NASA 150–52 (1996).
409
 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 909
(1996) (arguing that individual actors, “norm entrepreneurs,” can effectuate changes in
shared social meaning and expectations, and that a “norm cascade” can occur with respect
to changed norms); id. at 929 (“People often act in accordance with norms that they wish
were otherwise or even despise.”); cf. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 358–64 (1997) (arguing that “esteem-
based” norms can inºuence change because they encourage actors to follow the consensus
in order to secure esteem).
410
 Cf. Linda Klebe Trevino, A Cultural Perspective on Changing and Developing Or-
ganizational Ethics, 4 Res. Org. Change & Dev. 195 (1990).
411
 See Berry, supra note 77, at 281, 361; Sandra G. Boodman, “Why” Is Tough to
Answer in Priest Abuse Cases: Uncertainties Fuel Debate About Offenders’ Treatment and
Its Aftermath, Wash. Post, June 1, 2002, at A1; Jim Yardley, Zero Tolerance Takes Big
Toll in a Texas Diocese, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 2002, at A1.
412
 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting that almost half of reported inci-
dents involved pre-teen victims).
413
 See Powell & Romano, supra note 398.
414
 The shared and unique experience of clergy might make this inªltration especially
difªcult. As noted by one commentator, this experience strongly militates against opening
up to outsiders: “Occupations characterized by shared experiences of prolonged or difªcult
preparation and intense confrontations with life-and-death events naturally close ranks.”
Peter Steinfels, The Church’s Sex-Abuse Crisis: What’s Old, What’s New, What’s Needed—
and Why, Commonweal, Apr. 19, 2002, at 13, 19.
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as a result of its failure to act decisively by bringing abusive priests to jus-
tice, self-interest should now logically impel the Church to self-police.
This predisposition, in turn, could be backed by enforced self-regulation,
which (as discussed above) plays a central role in modern corporate crime
control. Self-regulation is ideally based on “rules tailored to the unique
set of contingencies” facing the entity, with input from other interested
parties, backed by the sanctioning capacity of the state.415 Among other
advantages, the approach facilitates a sense of ownership, which is hope-
fully enhanced when the entity has a primary role in writing and enforc-
ing its own code of conduct.416
To ensure internal compliance with such rules, Professor John Braith-
waite advocates that a designated corporate compliance director be re-
quired to report to a speciªed regulatory entity and face criminal liability
for failing to do so.417 Braithwaite’s prescription is evidenced in the cur-
rent use of corporate compliance ofªcers418 and also the recent require-
ment by Congress that corporate heads certify the ªnancial accuracy and
verity of balance sheets.419
The approach is also taking nascent form in the Catholic Church.
Although the Vatican rejected several core components of the plan adopted
by the Conference of Bishops in Dallas, such as the zero tolerance pol-
icy,420 it left intact an internal auditing procedure whereby dioceses will
be monitored for progress in stamping out clergy sex abuse and be sub-
ject to an annual public report.421 The report will publicly specify those
dioceses deemed “out of compliance” with the educative and safety-related
measures of the Church’s Charter for the Protection of Children and
Young People.422
Additional strategic possibilities may follow from a recent landmark
criminal plea agreement between the Diocese of Manchester, New
Hampshire, and the State Attorney General, resulting from an investiga-
tion into how the Diocese handled the cases of sixty priests accused of
abuse over the past forty years. The Attorney General found sufªcient
evidence that the Diocese endangered the welfare of children as a result
                                                                                                                             
415
 John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime
Control, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1466, 1470–71 (1982).
416
 Id. at 1478; see also id. at 1479 (“When the company writes the laws it is more
difªcult for it to rationalize illegality by reference to the law’s being an ass.”). Moreover,
to the extent First Amendment Free Exercise concerns are prompted by governmental in-
trusion into religious institutions, such concerns are mitigated by the Church’s active in-
volvement in the promulgation and enforcement of its governing policies and rules.
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 See John Braithwaite & Brent Fisse, Self-Regulation and the Control of Corporate
Crime, in Private Policing 221, 227–28 (Clifford Shearing & Peter Stenning eds., 1987).
418
 See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
419
 See Paul Beckett, Executives Face Harsh Sanctions in Corporate-Governance Law,
Wall St. J., July 31, 2002, at C7 (discussing the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
421
 See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 114.
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 Id.
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of knowingly failing to remove them from the reach of abusive priests.
On the verge of going before a grand jury, the Attorney General secured
a comprehensive plea agreement in early December 2002.423 According to
the news release accompanying the agreement, the State decided not to
pursue the indictments for two reasons:
First, the Diocese has acknowledged that certain of its decisions
concerning the assignment to ministry of priests who had
abused minors in the past resulted in other minors being vic-
timized. Second, the Diocese has agreed to comply with several
conditions that will safeguard children, ensure transparency of
both its prior and future conduct, and create a system of ac-
countability.424
The agreed-to plea conditions include inter alia:
• submission by the Diocese to the Attorney General of annual
external audits on how the Diocese has responded to abuse alle-
gations, and permitting the Attorney General to review and com-
ment on relevant policies and procedures;
• enhanced mandatory reporting requirements relating to the sex-
ual abuse of minors, as well as written acknowledgment by all
Diocesan personnel that they know and understand the require-
ments;
• training of Diocesan personnel on issues of child sexual abuse;
• establishment of a centralized ofªce to handle abuse allega-
tions, to establish appropriate policies and procedures, and to
maintain all pertinent records; and
• public disclosure of all records possessed by the Diocese re-
lating to priests accused of sexual abuse.425
The national Church leadership, unfortunately, has tried to distance
itself from the agreement, with U.S. Conference of Bishops head Bishop
William Gregory stating that he “understand[s] the pressures under which
the Diocese acted,” and that the agreement is “speciªc to the facts in the
Diocese of Manchester and to the laws of the State of New Hampshire.”426
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 See Plea Agreement, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 02-S-1154 (N.H. Super. Ct.
Dec. 9, 2002), available at http://www.state.nh.us/nhdoj/Press%20Release/Diocese%20
Final%20Agreement.pdf. By agreement of the parties, the conditions of the plea agreement
will be reviewed in ªve years. Id.
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 See Press Release, N.H. Attorney General Phillip T. McLaughlin, Investigation of





 Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Bishops’ President Issues
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Gregory added that the agreement “does not in any way indicate agree-
ment on the part of any other diocese or of the United States Conference
of Catholic Bishops in the legal analysis on which the ofªce of the Attor-
ney General of New Hampshire has acted.”427
Ideally, in the future, such defensive sentiments will be neither felt
nor voiced, and advances toward greater Church transparency and ac-
countability will not have to result from the dire resort to enterprise criminal
liability. Rather, as with strategies now being advanced to combat urban
street crime, proactive measures that draw upon and reinforce the indige-
nous capacity of the Church to self-police should be undertaken.428 For this
to materialize, major institutional reform must take place to ensure that
both the rank-and-ªle personnel and the leaders of the Church become, in
effect, co-partners with government in preventing, detecting, and report-
ing sexually abusive behaviors within the Church. By doing so, Church
leaders will greatly enhance the chances for pervasive institutional change,
and, concomitantly, reduce the systemic costs to government associated
with enforcement in the secretive conªnes of the Church.429
Given the public mood, however, whether such measures will come
to fruition remains very much in doubt. Public revulsion over the Church’s
use of civil settlements, especially when sealed,430 suggests that the re-
tributive impulse and expressivism remain vital in this context as else-
where.431 In the end, the question is not whether individual priests who
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sexually offend should be prosecuted; such prosecutions must be vigor-
ously pursued.432 Rather, the question is what approach optimizes the
prospects for institutional cooperation and assistance by the Church in
preventing clergy sexual abuse, smoking it out from within the Church
should it occur, and minimizing the likelihood of its continued perpetra-
tion. If lessons from the realms of family and corporation have transfer-
able value, society might be best advised to think twice before resorting
to aggressive use of criminal sanctions.
IV. Conclusion
One unmistakable hallmark of modern America is its partiality for
the criminal law and its enforcement.433 This Article has focused upon
three institutions—the Church, family, and corporation—that over time
have afforded varying degrees of sanctuary from this aggressive crimi-
nalization. Only recently has the government invoked the criminal law in
response to reported incidents of clergy child sexual abuse, much as it
did with regard to child and spousal abuse in the late 1800s and corporate
wrongdoing in the early 1900s. The ancient traditions and sanctions of
the Church, as the institution itself became painfully aware, were simply
not a proper substitute.
The application of the criminal law to Church-based harms, as with
corporations and families, however, is not necessarily the ultimate solu-
tion. While sexually abusive clergy of course must be prosecuted to the
full extent of the law, it remains an open question whether aggressive use
of the criminal law—for example, prosecution of church ofªcials and
even the Church—holds the most promise for eradicating abuse within
the Church. Indeed, experience in the domains of family and corporation
might support a more nuanced approach to addressing what by all ap-
pearances has endured as an institution-wide problem. Although by no
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laws prohibiting the sexual abuse of minors, needless to say, are not “sticky.” What is nec-
essary is that abuse allegations be brought to the attention of police and prosecutors, and
that prosecutions be pursued.
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means a perfect ªt, the similarly closed realms of family and corporation
hold promise for yielding instructive insights in the effort to combat sex-
ual abuse by clergy.
